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On Target or Off the Mark:
A Content Analysis of Air Force News Release Usage
In Prestige and Air Force-Related Newspapers
During Operation Northern Watch

by

Amie R. Mize

An Applied Project Presented in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Mass Communication

Walter Cronkite School
of Journalism and Telecommunication

Arizona State University

May, 2000

On Target or Off the Mark:
A Content Analysis of Air Force News Release Usage
In Prestige and Air Force-Related Newspapers
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
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Abstract

This study evaluated the use of information contained in U.S. Air Force news releases about Operation Northern Watch by three national newspapers -- the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times* from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999. The purpose of the study was posed as a research question: To what degree did the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times* use information provided in U.S. Air Force news releases regarding Operation Northern Watch?

The research involved a content analysis in the context of a case study, examining news articles from "Section A" of the two prestige newspapers and all news articles filling the news hole in the Air Force-related newspaper. News releases and articles were compared to determine whether certain releases could have generated particular articles. If a match was found, the release and article were paired and coded.

All of the releases examined contained a "positive" tone. Nearly 60% of the articles examined contained a "positive" tone, 21% were "balanced," and less than 15% were "negative." All releases were "hard news," and all but one was "past-oriented." Most of the articles were "hard news" and "past-oriented."

Most articles in the prestige newspapers used "minimal" information from the news releases, while the *Air Force Times* used "minimal" and "significant" information equally. Nearly half of the articles examined used sources outside the Air Force, but inside the Department of Defense. Less than 60% of all articles examined were found to contain "very high accuracy," meaning all of the five W's (who, what, where, when, and why) provided in the release were present and correct in the articles.

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Chapter 1

Background of the Problem

Introduction

The media are one of the main sources of information for the American people about major institutions, including the U.S. military (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1980; Green, 1994; Parenti, 1981; Vician, 1996). These scholars have suggested the American public needs the media's help to discover the issues of the day and their importance.

Lippmann (1922) was one of the first scholars during the 20th century to suggest the concept of media agenda-setting, observing that the media provided people with views of the world since most people have limited opportunities to personally observe the many institutions and daily events surrounding them. Cohen (1963) expanded the agenda-setting theory when he noted the media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to *think*, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to *think about*" (p. 13).

Bennett and Manheim (1993) contended that the public in a democracy has an obligation to gather information and to be informed. "People are expected to develop, more or less independently of their leadership, a fairly astute grasp of the issues of the day" (Bennett & Manheim, 1993, p. 333). Other researchers have suggested the American public needs the media's help to discover the issues of the day and their significance (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1980; Green, 1994; Lippmann, 1922; Parenti, 1981; Vician, 1996).

According to Turk (1986), media professionals rely on a variety of sources to inform them of important issues. One of these sources is the news release, distributed to media outlets

by public relations personnel. A news release is written “to communicate announcements, information on special events, spot news, responses to events, features and reactions to bad news” (Newsom & Carrell, 1998, p. 233). Through news releases, public relations people can fulfill their obligation to “satisfy people’s right to know about the operation of government units and the activities of corporations and nonprofit organizations that affect the public interest” (Lerbinger, 1972, p. 69).

Several researchers found that public relations activities, such as the use of news releases, had a moderate to significant influence on the content of newspaper articles (Aronoff, 1976; Lacy & Matusik, 1983; Martin & Singletary, 1981; Rings, 1971; Sachzman, 1976; Stoyanoff, 1987.) However, a study by Walters and Walters (1992) found that many newspapers’ use of news releases is unclear. Researchers found that news release usage by newspapers ranged from as low as 38% to as high as 85.9% (Aronoff, 1976; Martin & Singletary, 1981; Stoyanoff, 1987; Walters & Walters, 1992; Walters, Walters, & Starr, 1994.) As the range of these results demonstrates, frequent use of news releases by PR practitioners doesn’t guarantee publicity for an organization unless newspapers actually use them.

Because of the researcher’s affiliation with the Air Force, this study focused on the relationship between U.S. Air Force public affairs and the print media during Operation Northern Watch as conveyed through Air Force press releases and their resulting newspaper articles.

Role of U.S. Air Force Public Affairs

The U.S. military, like many other government agencies, uses the term “public affairs” to describe its public relations function. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000) define public affairs as

"a specialized part of public relations that builds and maintains government and local community relations in order to influence public policy (p. 17).

In 1913, the Gillett Amendment to an appropriation bill was presented in the House of Representatives. The amendment specifies that federal agencies cannot spend money for publicity unless specifically authorized by Congress (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000). Public Law 92-351, Section 608 (a), enacted July 13, 1972, reaffirmed this legislation. The law prohibits government spending on publicity or propaganda purposes designed to address any legislation pending before Congress (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000). The authors stated that although public relations is not specifically mentioned in either the 1913 bill or the 1972 law, most government agencies, like the military, use the term "public affairs" to describe the process of fostering and maintaining relationships with the public.

Military public affairs officers serve as members of the unit commander's personal staff, advising the commander and other key staff members on public affairs matters. Public affairs officers are liaisons between the military installation and all of its external publics, including the media. They oversee all public affairs functions, such as media relations, internal information, community relations, and public affairs plans. (*AFI 35-101*, 1999).

Military-Media Relationship

The military and the media have shared an adversarial, and sometimes hostile, relationship throughout U.S. history (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995; Young & Jesser, 1997). However, researchers have noted that while adversarial, the relationship between U.S. military public affairs and the media is a mutually dependent one (Cutlip, 1976; Kopenhaver, Martinson & Ryan, 1984; Pomerantz, 1990). Unfortunately, many attempts to bridge the gap between these

two opposing institutions have collapsed in the first stressful stages of a conflict or crisis because both pursue different objectives and often hold different values (Ricks, 1993).

Statement of the Problem

It is important to examine how the military-media relationship manifests itself from situation to situation due to its historical significance. This research project examined the extent to which prestige and Air Force-related newspapers used the information provided in U.S. Air Force news releases about Operation Northern Watch. According to the United States European Command Web site (www.eucom.mil/operations/ONW/index.htm), Operation Northern Watch was a Combined Task Force directed to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq and to monitor Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and 688. The joint U.S. force included personnel from all branches of the U.S. military. The operation began January 1, 1997 and was on going at the time of the publication of this study. The purpose of the study is posed as a research question: To what degree did the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times* use information provided in U.S. Air Force news releases regarding Operation Northern Watch?

Several sub-questions will help to focus the study:

1. What was the tone of the news release (positive, negative, or balanced)?
2. What was the tone of the resulting newspaper article (positive, negative, or balanced)?
3. What was the type of news release sent to the newspapers examined (hard news, feature, announcement, past-oriented, current, or future-oriented)?
4. What was the type of newspaper article resulting from the news release (hard

news, feature, announcement, past-oriented, current, or future-oriented)?

5. What was the extent of news release usage by prestige newspapers (minimal, moderate, significant, verbatim)?
6. What was the extent of news release usage by the Air Force-related newspaper? (minimal, moderate, significant, verbatim)?
7. What kinds of sources did the three newspapers use in their articles about Operation Northern Watch (inside the Air Force, outside the Air Force/inside Department of Defense, outside the Air Force/outside Department of Defense)?
8. What was the accuracy of the content of the resulting news articles?

Method

A content analysis in the context of a case study was used to compare information regarding Operation Northern Watch presented in U.S. Air Force news releases to stories generated from those news releases in two major circulation daily newspapers and one trade weekly newspaper. A content analysis is defined by Kerlinger (1964) as “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables” (p. 525). Wimmer and Dominick (1997) defined a case study as “an empirical inquiry that uses multiple sources of data to investigate a problem” (p. 477).

The study also incorporated a qualitative research component. In order to place the data generated from the content analysis into context, three military and media experts were identified and interviewed. The process of elite interviewing refers to information gained through consulting experts in the field (Dexter, 1970). An interview schedule (see Appendix A) was

constructed and used as a basis for comparison of responses. The experts represent both military and media views during the period coinciding with the data under study.

Newspapers. Two of the newspapers, *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*, are daily publications. They are newspapers of record, they publish local, national and international stories, they represent two different areas of the United States, and they have a general audience. The researcher selected these publications because they are prestige newspapers (ranked among the top five newspapers in daily circulation by *Editor and Publisher's International Yearbook* during the years examined.)

As of March 1998, the *Washington Post* had a daily circulation of 808,884 and the fifth largest daily circulation among all metropolitan and national newspapers, according to the Audit Bureau of Circulations. This source also reported that the *Los Angeles Times* had a daily circulation of 1,095,007 and the fourth largest daily circulation among all metropolitan and national newspapers.

The third newspaper, the *Air Force Times*, is a weekly publication and was chosen by the researcher to be a purposive sample because its content caters to a military audience. The U.S. Department of Defense does not editorially control the content of the *Air Force Times*. According to the *Air Force Times* advertising department, its weekly circulation is 92,541.

News Releases. The researcher searched for U.S. Air Force news releases using the U.S. Air Force Web site, the nine U.S. Air Force major command Web sites (Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Special Operations Command, Air Force Education and Training Command, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe), the U.S. European Command Web site, and the Department of Defense Web site. The same search terms used to locate articles for

the study were used to locate relevant news releases. Releases were matched to articles based on date and related information to determine if the release could have generated the article or contributed to the information contained in the article.

Articles. Only those news articles from the front page and "Section A" of each of the prestige newspapers were examined, excluding editorials and special columns. News articles from the *Air Force Times* were obtained by searching the entire publication. The researcher examined only those articles from 1997, 1998, and 1999. Articles were obtained using either the newspapers' Web site archives or Lexis Nexis. The same search terms used to locate news releases for the study were used to locate relevant articles.

Unit of analysis. The unit of analysis for both the releases and the articles was the sentence. For example, the researcher determined the tone of the release or article by evaluating each sentence contained in a paragraph and comparing them to obtain an overall rating for the paragraph. Then each paragraph was compared to obtain an overall rating of "positive," "negative," or "balanced."

Limitations

This research project was constrained by certain limitations.

1. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., confirmed that it does not post every news release sent to media outlets on its Web sites. Therefore, it is possible that certain articles were generated by news releases that were not located on the designated web sites.
2. The search terms used may not have produced every article written on the subject of Operation Northern Watch, therefore hindering a thorough analysis of all articles.

3. The researcher must rely on the archive of news releases maintained at each location examined. It is possible that the news releases obtained are only a partial sample of all releases sent by each organization.

4. An article may have been generated by a source of information other than the Air Force news release, even though the subjects and the dates match.

5. Content analysis cannot be used to determine the reasons for discrepancies between the release and the article.

6. Several of the Air Force Web sites examined maintained press release archives for only one year, therefore, press releases from all years being studied were not available.

Assumptions

1. The organizations used as sources posted all copies of news releases sent on the subject of Operation Northern Watch on their respective Web sites.
2. All copies of posted releases were sent to the media outlets being examined.

Scope and Significance

Because the media have the power to influence the American public's opinions about issues and their significance (Entman, 1989), it is crucial that the public receives accurate and balanced information with which to make sound judgments. Hiebert (1991) said, "To win a war today, government not only has to win on the battlefield; it must win in the minds of its publics" (p.115). If the media provide the public with incorrect or biased information about the U.S. Air Force, public opinion about the Air Force may be affected, and its ability to perform its mission may suffer.

According to Major Andy White, an Air Force public affairs officer assigned to Operation Northern Watch, "the no-fly zones are a perfect example of the use of military power where political and media relations associated with the operations are as important (if not more so) to achieving national policy objectives as the military objectives themselves" (personal communication, February 24, 2000).

This study examined the level of accuracy and balance of prestige newspapers and Air Force-related publications when informing the public about major Air Force operations. Air Force public affairs practitioners can use these findings to determine which type of news releases are used most often by certain types of newspapers. By demonstrating how print media outlets are using their releases, perhaps this study will provide insight into what other information, if any, should be included in future news releases.

Chapter 2

Review of the Literature

The media provide the American public with news about society's people, culture, and institutions (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1980; Green, 1994; Parenti, 1981; Vician, 1996).

Lippmann (1922) was one of the first scholars this century to suggest the concept of media agenda-setting, observing that the media provided people with views of the world since most people have limited opportunities to personally observe the many institutions and daily events surrounding them. Cohen (1963) expanded the agenda-setting theory when he noted the media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to *think*, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to *think about*" (p. 13).

According to Iyengar and Simon (1993), the amount of news coverage devoted to various political issues will determine the degree of importance the public attaches to these issues. Their argument was also called "media agenda-setting" (p. 367), following the tradition of Lippmann (1922). Entman (1989) observed the possibility that media reports significantly shape the attitudes of the American public because people have so little knowledge about affairs outside their personal experiences. He noted that this ability to shape public opinion gives the media a significant amount of power over public opinion. McCombs and Shaw (1993) stated, "Media not only tell us what to *think about*, but also *how to think about it*, and consequently, *what to think*" (p. 65).

Power is dependent upon the control of information -- who has it, how and when they obtain it, and how they use it (Edelman, 1964). According to Bennett and Manheim (1993), the

public relies on news cues from the media for information on government, and the media is cued by elites about what information is important.

The Evolution of Military-Media Relations

The current military-media relationship didn't evolve overnight. The following are key events from the last 250 years of U.S. history that have shaped this sometimes amicable, sometimes volatile relationship into what exists today.

The Colonial Era. Conflicts between the nation's military and the news media can be traced to the period before the United States won its independence from Great Britain (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). In Colonial times, publishers of newspapers faced many obstacles, including censorship, harassment and even tar and feathers. In fact, James Rivington, the publisher of a newspaper loyal to England, suspended publication and returned to England after "a group of armed men rode into New York on Nov. 27, 1775, broke into the building, destroyed his press and carried away the type, which was later melted into bullets for use of the Patriots" (Thomas, 1932, p. 363).

As time passed and reporters began to gain more access to military operations, conflicts still arose between military leaders wanting to keep battle plans secret, and the press, who wanted to use information whenever and wherever they saw fit.

The 1800s. In 1846, with the beginning of the Mexican War, the invention of technology such as the telegraph and the pony express allowed news correspondents to compete for scoops (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). According to the authors, the most famous reporter of the time was the founder of the *Picayune* in New Orleans, George W. Kendall. He rode with McCullough's Rangers, working the front lines and "hobnobbing with generals" (p. 36).

Historians credit Kendall with the first reports of many important battles near the Mexican capital. However, even with the technological advances of the day, most news reports of military activities were at least 10 days old (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), soldier-printers published the first “camp newspapers” during the Mexican War. These publications were regarded as the first military public affairs effort and were used by civilian newspapers “as a chief source of news from the seat of the war” (p. 36).

During the Civil War, the first real-time reporting emerged and the Associated Press was created (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). Government and military leaders on both sides did their best to quash publishers’ attempts to report information they thought harmed the war effort. In truth, sometimes this included information they didn’t like, not merely stories they found harmful to security (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), the most notorious press hater of the Civil War was General William Sherman. He believed there was a direct relationship between censorship and military victory. He blamed the media for the North’s defeat in the first Battle of Bull Run because two prominent newspapers, the *Washington Star* and *The New York Times*, listed the order of battle, including troop destination and strength. Sherman once said, “Now to every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter goes along, filling up our transports, swelling our trains, reporting our progress, guessing at places, picking up dropped expressions, inciting jealousy and discontent, and doing infinite mischief (Knightley, 1975, p. 28).

Early 1900s. During World War I, Congress enacted some of the most restrictive measures against the press in the history of the nation (Knightley, 1975). Some of these

measures included The Espionage Act of 1917, which prohibited the publication of any information that was thought to even remotely lend assistance to the enemy's cause.

The Sedition Act of 1918 was another method used by the government to control the press. This act forbade any criticism of the U.S. government or its military, and was used to justify censorship. War correspondents during this period were accredited, then forced to take an oath to write the truth, ordered to submit a \$10,000 bond, and finally, were required to sign an agreement to submit all stories to the military press officer before filing them (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). Following this process, war correspondents permanently lived in military camps with the soldiers. Those who failed to submit their stories for review had their press passes revoked. This happened to only five correspondents during the entire war.

Frederick Palmer, the chief American censor for the U.S. Army in the European Theater, had also been a newsman. He commented that he led a "double-life," and worked as a "public liar to keep up the spirit of the armies and people of our side" (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 38).

The 1940s. World War II, especially the campaigns in North Africa, provided everything news correspondents could desire -- plenty of stories, little censorship, and good communications (Knightley, 1975). According to Knightley (1975), professionally, "the correspondents were all absorbed into the military machine without much trouble."

According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), during World War II, the United States was of one patriotic mind. "Editors accepted censorship as the price of national security" (p.38). The press was told exactly what could and could not be printed by the Office of War Information and the Office of Censorship, established by President Roosevelt in 1942.

Field press censorship, called “security review,” was a process in which a reporter’s copy was reviewed prior to filing to ensure that no sensitive information was revealed that could be of use to the enemy. This was an effective means of protecting sensitive operations like the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, which required absolute secrecy to ensure its success and minimize Allied casualties. One military censor, at a meeting in Washington, D.C., said, “I wouldn’t tell the people anything until the war is over and then I’d tell them who won” (Knightley, 1975, p. 269).

Unfortunately, military censors had no operational guidelines and sometimes used censorship in a capricious fashion as a means to protect military commanders’ egos, instead of for its intended purpose -- to protect sensitive information vital to operational security (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). In his book *The First Casualty*, Knightley (1975) said, “If the policy of shielding the nation from reality, maintaining morale by avoiding the truth, and convincing the public that the war was being conducted by a command of geniuses could have been typified in one area and by one commander, that area was the South-West Pacific and that commander was General Douglas MacArthur” (p. 279). MacArthur often ordered stories changed to suit him in order to control his image as projected by correspondents (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995; Knightley, 1975). According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), MacArthur was the most notorious practitioner of censorship. “His command often was reported as having low or light casualties. If a reporter found anything to the contrary, the story simply would not pass the military censors” (p. 39).

The 1950s. During the beginning of the Korean War, there was no censorship imposed upon reporters. Instead, members of the media followed voluntary guidelines aimed at maintaining military secrecy (Knightley, 1975). Eventually, MacArthur expanded these

guidelines to include “any criticism of decisions made by United Nations commanders in the field, as well as conduct by Allied soldiers on the battlefield” (Knightley, 1975, p. 337).

According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), the voluntary guidelines caused some security leaks. Critics argued that the media’s criticism of corruption in the South Korean government, along with stories highlighting poor leadership and lack of equipment for American forces negatively influenced public opinion in the United States (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

Although the correspondents said their motives were patriotic, they were confused about what kinds of stories they were allowed to write, and even more confused by MacArthur’s addendum to their voluntary guidelines. As a result, the correspondents asked military officials to establish a “full, official, and compulsory censorship” (p. 337) system similar to that imposed during World War II (Knightley, 1975).

The Vietnam Era. The Vietnam War is the only war in history lost by the United States (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). No censorship was ever imposed on the media during the entire conflict. They were free to cover whatever they wished, and were given access to military operations and transportation when available. According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), this lack of censorship served as a high point for military-media relations.

However, the low point came when many military members blamed the press for America’s defeat. More than 25 years later, some military members still held this view (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). In a survey conducted by The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University in 1995, 64% of military officers surveyed felt news coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort. According to this survey, few top military and government officials interviewed held this belief.

Melvin R. Laird, the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1968 to 1972, said that placing blame on the media was wrong. He said it was not the media's fault, rather "it was Vietnam that did it. That was an unpopular war. I don't blame the press. I blame the way President Johnson handled it" (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 40).

General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he was one who returned from Vietnam with a negative opinion of the press. He believed there was a built-in distrust of the media among members of the military today. He said many military members are still trying to solve the Vietnam media-military problem. He said, "...I would like to think that they're doing it as a kind of reflection of what they heard from some of their [military] elders. You know, real men don't talk to the press...." (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 40).

In the years following the Vietnam War, members of the military were increasingly fearful of the media. They felt they had more to lose than they had to gain by talking to the media, and left all interactions with the media to public affairs personnel. Unfortunately, public affairs officers were rarely included in operational planning meetings, so they were not familiar with the details of military actions (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

The 1980s. When Grenada appeared on the American military's radar in 1983, the commanders planned only for the operational aspects of the mission, completely excluding public affairs officers. The justification given for this exclusion was the need for secrecy.

When 600 reporters arrived in Barbados to cover the conflict, military commanders were not prepared to handle them. Because they had not planned for the media's presence and were so intently focused on the impending operation, they denied reporters access to the first two days of the operation. Their reason was that it was simply "too hard" (p. 44) to make plans to accommodate 600 reporters in the heat of battle (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

The media were understandably outraged by the military's denial of access. This did not help to strengthen the already tenuous military-media relationship.

As a result of the media's treatment in Grenada, a special commission was convened by then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey. The Sidle Commission, named for its chairman, retired Army Major General Winant Sidle, was tasked with reviewing the events affecting the media in Grenada. The Sidle Commission established the Department of Defense National Media Pool (DNMP).

While the DNMP was a step in the right direction, it wasn't enough to completely solve the problem of press access (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), the establishment of the DNMP actually proved counterproductive to public affairs planning by commanders. "Many in the military had the impression that the DNMP would smooth future relations with the press, obviating any need for military commanders to become more formally involved in the public affairs process than they had been before" (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 44).

The military eventually acknowledged that many difficulties in the military-media relationship could have been diffused through public affairs involvement in operational planning. The Air Force, specifically, addressed these issues in future public affairs instructions to practitioners in the field. For example, the December 1999 instruction stated that public affairs officers should be members of the unit commander's key staff, advising the commander and other staff members on all public affairs matters. They should have immediate access to the commander at all times to ensure public affairs duties are performed quickly and successfully. They are responsible for keeping the installation's military and civilian population informed of

news and policies affecting them, as well as designing public affairs plans and programs to be used in military operations and exercises. (*AFI 35-101*, 1999).

The flaw with the DNMP was uncovered during Operation Just Cause, the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney decided that the secrecy of the operation was too great to jeopardize by involving the DNMP in the pre-invasion stages. Therefore, the pool arrived too late to cover any of the decisive U.S. assaults in that brief conflict (Matthews, 1991).

The military played no part in the decision to deploy the DNMP after the invasion began. However, because military commanders hadn't considered the public affairs aspects of the invasion, they were able to provide little support for the pool once it did reach Panama. For example, the lack of helicopters prevented the media from covering what was left of the action. Simple planning by the military could have alleviated this problem (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). Despite the fact that the administration rather than the military kept the media out of the first few days of the invasion of Panama, news media leaders were becoming increasingly skeptical of the pool system since it always seemed to work in exercises but fell apart during the "real thing" (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 18).

Patrick Sloyan, who covered Operation Desert Storm for *Newsday* and earned a Pulitzer Prize for war coverage, compared the pool situation to a comic strip. He said, "There's all the good will in the world, and we agree, and they pull the football back just as we're running up to kick it, like Lucy does to Charlie Brown in *Peanuts*. That's bad faith on their part, on the part of the political leadership. They don't want us reporting about American soldiers getting killed. They don't want that story out; they don't want those pictures out. And it doesn't matter what administration we're talking about" (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 18).

As a result of the DNMP disaster in Panama, General Colin Powell, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a message to all major military commanders in all branches of service, stressing the importance of planning and support for media coverage of military operations. Part of this message read:

Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations are important...and warrant your personal attention....Media coverage and pool support requirements must be planned simultaneously with operational plans and should address all aspects of operational activity, including direct combat, medical, prisoner-of-war, refugee, equipment repair, refueling and rearming, civic action, and stabilization activities. Public Affairs annexes should receive command attention when formulating and reviewing all such plans (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 45).

Fortunately, it was this directive that finally helped to change attitudes about the media within the military ranks. At last, commanders realized the importance of personal involvement in public affairs media planning (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

The 1990s. With the onset of Operation Desert Shield in August 1990, followed by Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, the military and the media worked together to try to make coverage of this conflict the most comprehensive ever seen. Unfortunately, the quality of coverage during this time was compromised by old hostilities, the fast-moving pace of battle, lack of access to communication equipment, and poor public affairs practices (Fialka, 1991).

In *Hotel Warriors* (Fialka, 1991), the author describes an incident in which an Army lieutenant constantly badgered two reporters desperate to call their editors to report breaking

news in time for the morning edition of their newspapers. He reluctantly drove them to a pay phone to call in their stories, since there were no available phones for them on the base. According to Fialka (1991), the lieutenant was "ushering other people into the line ahead of them. He'd say, 'Go ahead. You're military. These people are just reporters'" (p.14). Before the reporters could make their calls, the lieutenant decided they had been so rude and uncooperative that they should be taken immediately back to the base (Fialka, 1991).

The lieutenant, Max Blumenfeld, said he doesn't hate the press, but he thinks "the American media, from my point of view, cannot be cooperative. They are still out to, you know, let's get that scoop, let's make a name for ourselves, let's be the first one in" (Fialka, 1991, p. 14).

Because of the criticisms voiced by many of the news organizations involved in covering the Gulf War, representatives of those organizations met with representatives from the Pentagon to develop the *DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations*, published in 1992. Once again, this provided emphasis to military commanders of the importance of their personal involvement in planning for news coverage of combat operations (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

As the history of military-media relations has shown, many of the strides taken to improve military-media relations have collapsed in the first stressful stages of conflict because they are inevitably artificial (Ricks, 1993). The author attributes this to the fact that both institutions "pursue very different objectives and often hold very different values" (p. v).

According to Aukofer and Lawrence (1995), "the press wants to tell the story while the military wants to win the war and keep casualties to a minimum" (p. vii).

While their fundamental differences will most likely never change, leaders in both fields realize the importance of the other. Military leaders acknowledge “their responsibility to the First Amendment guarantee and the people’s right to know” (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. vii). In a survey conducted by The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University in 1995, 83% of military officers expressed the belief that the media are just as crucial to maintaining American freedom as the military (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). Media leaders also appreciate that without the protection of America’s military forces, the nation’s constitutional freedoms would not have been preserved for more than 200 years (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995).

When the media cover any conflict that engages the American military in battle, they have an important responsibility to uphold. Braestrup (1985) observed, “our free press, when it accompanies the nation’s soldiers into battle, performs a unique role. It serves as eyewitness; it forges a bond between the citizen and the soldier, and at its best, it strives to avoid manipulation either by officials or by critics of the government through accurate independent reporting. It also provides one of the checks and balances that sustains the confidence of the American people in their political system and armed forces” (p.13).

Changes in Public Opinion from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf War

The military-media relationship during the Persian Gulf War was haunted by the ghosts of the Vietnam War (Lund-Vaa, 1992). According to McLeod et al. (1994), many analysts wondered if the scars of the Vietnam War would make the American public reluctant to wage another war on foreign soil. At the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, many government and military leaders believed liberal, negative media coverage of the Vietnam War was a key element in America’s defeat there (Hallin, 1986).

Vietnam. No official censorship was imposed on the media during the Vietnam War (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). According to the researchers, the media were free to cover whatever they wished, and they were given access to military operations and transportation when available.

Herman and Chomsky (1988) observed through content analysis of the period preceding the Tet Offensive that the media were actually in favor of the war. The Tet Offensive was a series of attacks by the Vietcong in 1968 on six major South Vietnamese cities, 35 province capitals, 64 district capitals, and most U.S. military bases from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to the Delta (Hess, 1998; Levy, 1978). Herman and Chomsky (1988) also found that polls taken during this period indicated watching television coverage of the war made the American public more supportive of the war effort until 1969, when media coverage began to highlight the Paris peace talks.

According to Winter (1991), it was the U.S. government, not the media or the American public, that first gave up hope of a military victory after the Tet Offensive. Herman and Chomsky (1988) stated that the media, followed by the public, “mirrored the changes in elite opinion” (p. 220). According to the researchers, the media gathered information from the government about the state of the war and passed it on to the American public, demonstrating the media’s ability to influence public opinion.

According to Mueller (1973), public support for a conflict ultimately declines with increases in casualties and the emergence of internal opposition. Winter (1991) observed the “Vietnam syndrome” (p. 6), which he described as an inability of the military to win a war that is unpopular with the media and the public back home. As the Vietnam War progressed, casualties and internal opposition began to surface, and with the help of media coverage of the

government's doubts of military victory in Vietnam, public opinion began to shift in a negative direction, and the United States lost the war (Winter, 1991).

Persian Gulf War. The "Vietnam syndrome" (Winter, 1991, p. 6) would become an underlying theme of the Persian Gulf War. According to Winter (1991), President George Bush blamed the American media and lack of public support for the United States' defeat in Vietnam. During the early stages of the Persian Gulf War, President Bush alluded to the "Vietnam syndrome" (p. 6) when he thought public support for the troops or the use of force in Iraq was flagging (Winter, 1991). At the end of the Persian Gulf War, President Bush claimed to have defeated the "Vietnam syndrome" (p. 6) because the American media and public displayed overwhelming support for U.S. troops and the use of force in the Middle East (Winter, 1991). The researcher attributed some the "patriotic frenzy" (p. 8) during the Persian Gulf War to public guilt and remorse over the lack of support given to troops in Vietnam.

The differences between the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War existed partly because the world changed (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995). The researchers interviewed General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about his opinions concerning the media in Vietnam. He said, "...the world is different than it was in Vietnam. Technology is different. Reporting of events is a different issue. Access to things that are ongoing is a different issue than it was in Vietnam" (p. 40).

The Persian Gulf War was the first major international conflict fought in an age of technological advancements such as real-time telecommunications and satellite links. The media were able to broadcast the unfolding events of the conflict to the American public, as well as to the rest of the world (Taylor, 1993). This live-action communication technology will continue to cause the military concern about operational security because the media is concerned about

speed. According to General Normal Schwartzkopf, Supreme Commander during the Gulf War, “the reporters don’t have the sieve, if you will, to screen what it is they’re seeing. They don’t have the big picture to say, ‘Well, if I report this, does this become a breach of security; will this endanger the troops or not?’ They just don’t have that sieve...The problem is, in the world of CNN, the Saddam Husseins of the future are going to have their television sets turned on...” (Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995, p. 154).

The Importance of Public Opinion

Hiebert (1991) said, “To win a war today, government not only has to win on the battlefield; it must also win in the minds of its publics” (p. 115). Many other researchers have asserted the need for the U.S. military to develop and maintain a high level of public opinion and support for military operations and interventions (Dennis, 1991; Mowlana, Gerbner & Schiller, 1992; Watson, 1992). According to Kellner (1992), the military achieved this support during the Persian Gulf War by soliciting news stories to the media that the military wanted done and providing the media access to footage and interviews. This was an important goal for the military, according to Shell (1991). Hiebert (1991) stated “public relations is a primary weapon of war” (p. 108) and that mass communication plays a key role in modern warfare.

Role of U.S. Air Force Public Affairs

Definition. The difference between public relations and public affairs goes only as far as the name. Public relations scholar Rex Harlow defined public relations as:

The distinctive management function which helps to establish and maintain mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between an organization

and its publics; involves the management of problems or issues; helps management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion; defines and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest; helps management keep abreast of and effectively utilize change, serving as an early warning system to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and ethical communication and its principal tools” (Harlow, 1976, p. 36).

Public affairs performs these functions as well, but is technically defined as “a specialized part of public relations that builds and maintains government and local community relations in order to influence public policy” (Cutlip et al., 2000, p. 17).

Structure. The Directorate of Air Force Public Affairs (see Appendix B) provides trusted counsel to Air Force leaders concerning activities used to build public support and to achieve the Air Force core competencies (*AFI 35-101*, 1999). The six Air Force core competencies are air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support.

Air Force Instruction 35-101 (1999) outlines the responsibilities of every public affairs office in the Air Force. Headquarters U.S. Air Force Public Affairs is located in the Pentagon and is the approval authority for all Air Force level, major command, forward operating agency, direct reporting unit and environmental public affairs activities and guidance supporting national and international issues and events.

The headquarters directs strategic communication to promote the Air Force identity and build support for Air Force operations. It develops and implements communication strategies targeted toward informing national and international audiences about aerospace power’s impact

on global events. It manages programs to educate international audiences about the inherent capabilities of aerospace power and the core values of Air Force people: "integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do."

This office also plans and directs Public Affairs information operations to ensure our allies and enemies know the capabilities and resolve of the Air Force. Finally, it provides direction and policy for Air Force internal information, community and media relations, and security review programs during peace and war (*AFI 35-101*, 1999).

The Directorate of Public Affairs has 12 divisions to manage the national and international Air Force public affairs function: Public Communication, Air Force Bands, Air Force News and Information, Media Operations, Resources and Readiness, Office for Security Review, Assistant Director for Personnel Management, Strategic Communication, Executive Issues Group, Air Force News Agency, National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs, and Office of the Air Force Reserve Public Affairs.

Responsibilities of Public Affairs Officers. Public affairs officers at lower levels within the Air Force chain of command are members of the unit commander's personal staff, allowing them direct access to the commander so that public affairs duties can be accomplished successfully. They advise commanders and other staff officers on public affairs matters. Lower-level units contain internal information, media relations, community relations and plans divisions similar to the Directorate, but on a much smaller scale. The focus of these units is on keeping the local communities surrounding the base informed of Air Force activities relating to that particular installation.

Public affairs has a comprehensive infrastructure throughout the Air Force and functions as an efficient communications network, addressing the same issues to all publics. However,

command-unique events often result in different communications priorities, and competition can develop between Air Force, major command, and unit messages. In all cases, public affairs officers are directed to support their immediate commander first. Public affairs officers must be both responsible to commanders and to higher headquarters public affairs priorities. Air Force communication needs are best served when public affairs personnel speak with one voice at all levels.

Air Force Media Relations. The Air Force recognizes that the media are the primary communication channel to the public, therefore, every public affairs office has a responsibility to maintain a media relations program. The most common way Air Force public affairs practitioners deliver information to the media is in the form of a news release.

According to *Air Force Instruction 35-101* (1999), media relations is one of the primary means for achieving the four public affairs core competencies -- trusted counsel to Air Force leaders, airman morale and readiness, public trust and support, and global influence and deterrence. All military and civilian personnel must comply with the Secretary of Defense's Principles of Public Information (see Appendix C) in spirit and in letter. The overarching theme of Air Force Public Affairs is "full disclosure/minimum delay." Other media relations guidelines outlined in the instruction are: (1) present Air Force information professionally, simply and honestly; (2) be accurate, prompt and factual; (3) confine the information to field of expertise; (4) avoid the hypothetical and speculative; (5) reflect Air Force policy.

Internal vs. External Conflicts

According to McLeod et al. (1994), external and internal conflicts are an important driving force behind public opinion. They reported that the dynamics of social forces affect the composition of public opinion.

According to the researchers, internal conflicts, like the Los Angeles riots, result in the splintering of various parties involved in the conflict, which ultimately erodes social consensus.

In contrast, they observed that external conflicts, such as the Persian Gulf War, tend to “mobilize support behind authority” (p. 20). They found that conflicts between one social group and an external group increase the cohesion of the social group. According to the researchers, “wars between nations are particularly strong in mobilizing support behind objectives determined by the powerholders within the system” (p. 21).

Also, McLeod et al. (1994) found that attempts at opposition are likely to be inhibited by “agents of social control such as mass media” (p. 21).

The researchers observed that the cohesive effects of public opinion lead to social support for elements that are consistent with the consensus and cultivate animosity toward elements perceived as a challenge to the consensus. This observation was illustrated during the Persian Gulf War when President Bush portrayed those who supported the war as heroes, and implied that those who protested the war were being unpatriotic (Winter, 1991).

Mueller (1970) observed the tendency for international conflicts to result in a surge in public support for the American president during times of conflict. He called this tendency the “rally round the flag effect” (p. 21). According to Kellner (1993), the media play an intermediary role in the conflict process, acting as a primary conduit of information that

produces rally effects in the American public. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, the researcher found evidence that suggested the mainstream media coverage strongly supported the war.

McLeod et al. (1994) observed that external conflict produced public support for media roles, such as building cohesion and reducing tension, thus serving to maintain consensus.

According to Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1980), external conflict not only attracts media attention, but also attracts attention to the mass media. The researchers predicted the Persian Gulf War would be associated with relatively heavy media use, which according to Kellner (1993), would result in more people exposed to the rally effect. With many people turning to the mass media for information about the military operations involving U.S. troops, the media would be able to significantly shape the public's opinions about these involvements (Cohen, 1963; Entman, 1989; Gans, 1980; Green, 1994; Lippmann, 1922; Parenti, 1981; Vician, 1996).

Background of Operation Northern Watch

Overview. Operation Northern Watch was a Combined Task Force composed of personnel from all branches of the U.S. military, as well as military members from Great Britain and Turkey. This task force was directed to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq (see map in Appendix D) and to monitor Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and 688 (see Appendix E). The operation began January 1, 1997 and was on going at the time of the publication of this study.

Before examining the military-media relations during Operation Northern Watch, it is important to understand the history of the region to provide context for the operation, as well as for this study. Every military operation involves a history; however, it is not always told, either

by the media or by the military. Operation Northern Watch involves the protection of the Kurds from Saddam Hussein. To understand what was happening in northern Iraq during Operation Northern Watch, one must learn the history of the Kurdish people, which spans more than 2000 years, as well as the history of the region itself.

Pre-Christian Era. Operation Northern Watch evolved from a chain of events beginning long before the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The country of Iraq occupies territory once known as Mesopotamia. This region hosted many ancient civilizations, including the Sumerians, the Babylonians and the Kurds (DeShetler, 2000).

According to Ciment in his book *The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran* (1996), “the Kurds possess one of the oldest living cultures in the world today” (p. 36). One military historian for the Combined Task Force in Operation Northern Watch traced the Kurdish people to a technically advanced race who dwelt in a region of Mesopotamia called Kurdistan from 10,000-3,000 B.C. (DeShetler, 2000). The Kurds are credited with the domestication of animals as well as technological expansions in metallurgy, weaving, pottery, architecture, urbanization and a written language (DeShetler, 2000).

Kurdish unity, or cultural homogeneity, evolved over several thousand years (Ciment, 1996). Waves of invaders and migrants from Indo-Aryan-speaking areas to the north of Kurdistan descended on the Kurdish highlands, as well as Persia and India, bringing new languages and customs. The vast migration of Kurdish people toward the north and the west roughly established the outlines of present-day Kurdistan (Ciment, 1996). In the last few years of the pre-Christian era, the Romans established a border running through Kurdistan, dividing Roman Empire from the Parthian Empire on the Iranian plateau. After Rome’s disengagement from Kurdistan in the 4th century A.D., the last Kurdish kingdom fell and invasion plunged

Kurdistan into chaos for hundreds of years (Ciment, 1996). Finally, the spread of Islam provided “political power and cultural greatness” often called the Kurdish “golden age” (Ciment, 1996, p. 37).

Medieval Era. When the Ottomans closed off overland trade routes to the east, resulting in European expansion to the Atlantic, the Kurd’s homeland was removed from the center of Eurasian trade to its outskirts. This mercantile shift drove previously prosperous medieval Kurds into poverty and caused many Kurdish towns to wither away (Ciment, 1996).

During the 16th and 17th centuries, the eastwardly expanding Ottoman Empire met the Safavid Empire of Persia. The battles between these two expansionist cultures were fought on Kurdish land by massive armies that consumed what the land offered while depriving the enemy of its fruits. The “scorched earth” policies of both armies resulted in a ruined Kurdish countryside and way of life (Ciment, 1996, p. 38).

Following these conflicts, the Persians and the Ottomans divided Kurdistan roughly where the Romans and Parthians had divided it more than a thousand years earlier (Ciment, 1996). On the Ottoman side, various semi-independent emirates, or principalities, emerged. When possible, direct Ottoman rule was imposed. Where it was not possible, local emirs, or princes, were appointed and warned against rebelliousness. According to Ciment (1996), “the relationship between the Kurdish emirates and the sultan’s empire was a complex and occasionally volatile blend of independence and deference” (p. 39). This symbiotic relationship between emirs and sultans imposed social order in the region for nearly 300 years.

The 19th Century. Eventually, the system grew exploitative through misrule, court extravagance and an ever-increasing imperial military budget that favored tax-farming. Constantinople sold the right to collect taxes to private individuals who paid the government a

fixed fee “for the right to extract ruthlessly the maximum tax profit from their region” (Ciment, 1996, p. 39). According to Ciment (1996), many Kurdish historians agree that the demise of these principalities in the 19th century caused many of the problems currently affecting the Kurdish nation.

During the 19th century, a more chaotic tribal order developed (Ciment, 1996). The region’s economy was based on “raiding and smuggling” (p. 40). One historian commented that “the suppression of the semi-independent Kurdish principalities was followed by lawlessness and disorder” (Jwaideh, 1960, p. 212).

Although Kurdish rebelliousness against the Ottoman Empire existed due to “excessive taxation and brutal Ottoman justice” (p. 41), the Kurds were unsuccessful at separating themselves from the empire. Instead, they were co-opted by Constantinople through lavish titles and appointments for Kurdish leaders and a newly created military force.

World War I. During World War I, the Ottoman Empire sided with the Kaiser and lost the war. In President Woodrow Wilson “Fourteen Points,” he pushed for autonomy for non-Turkish nationalities. In the Treaty of Sevres, signed in 1920, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and local autonomy was given to the Kurds (DeShetler, 2000). However, a national revolution, led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, known as the “Eternal Leader” and “Father of the Turks,” reclaimed control throughout the region, including the new proposed Kurdish state (Ciment, 1996, p. 42; DeShetler, 2000).

Mid-1900s. With their state taken from them, the Kurds became permanent minorities in Turkey, Iraq and Iran (DeShetler, 2000). In all three countries, the Kurds founded political movements hoping to achieve varying degrees of autonomy. In northern Iraq in the 1960s, the Kurds took advantage of the expanding commerce of the region resulting from the boom in the

oil trade. As the Iraqi economy grew, the Kurds became increasingly dependent on the short land routes to Europe crossing their land (DeShetler, 2000).

In 1963, Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party, took control of Iraq. Ba'ath translates into English as “renaissance movement” and was not confined to Iraq. Syria and Egypt also embraced this movement, calling for Arab nations to unite as one (DeShetler, 2000). According to DeShetler (2000), the movement came during a time when corruption and Kurdish uprisings were blamed for the failures of the Arab states. As a result, Ba'ath sympathizers continually sought the genocide of the Kurdish race (DeShetler, 2000).

Saddam Hussein negotiated a deal with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leadership for an autonomous region to be established within four years of the signing of an agreement. However, a failed assassination attempt of the leader of the KDP was found to be the work of the Baghdad regime, and plans for the autonomous region quickly deteriorated. The KDP responded with attacks on Iraqi government forces and installations supported by Iran, the United States and Israel ((DeShetler, 2000)).

The 1980s. In 1980, the Iran-Iraq War began when Iraq invaded Iran (Gunter, 1992). While Iraq was preoccupied with the war, which soon became a long stalemate, the Iraqi Kurds virtually ruled themselves. In Iraq, the KDP supported Iran. The KDP and Iraqi troops constantly clashed. In 1983, Baghdad began using chemical warfare in response to the Iranian onslaught (Gunter, 1992).

Not only were the chemical attacks directed against Iranian troops, but also Iraqi Kurds, both rebels and civilians. The campaign was called “Anfal,” meaning the “spoils of war,” based on the eighth verse, or Sura, of the holy Quran, or Koran (DeShetler, 2000, p.3). On March 16, 1988, Baghdad attacked the town of Halabja, an Iraqi Kurdish city 15 miles from the Iranian

border and 150 miles from Baghdad, with mustard and cyanide gas dropped from an Iraqi warplane. The city had been captured by the Iranian army with the help of Iraqi Kurds, forcing Iraqi forces to surrender or withdraw. This attack killed approximately 5,000 people and was noted as the most notorious gas attack since World War I (Gunter, 1992).

In August 1988, Iran finally agreed to a cease-fire, partially as a result of Halabja (Gunter, 1992). Baghdad was able to focus its attention on the Iraqi Kurds now that the war with Iran had ended (Gunter, 1992). Throughout August, chemical weapons were dropped on 70 sites killing thousands of men, women and children. At least 60,000 Kurdish refugees fled across the Turkish border to escape the bombings (Gunter, 1992). They lived in tent cities, having been declared “terrorists and criminals” by Saddam Hussein (p. 45). Many of the refugees, mostly children, were dying from the freezing temperatures in the tent cities. According to Gunter (1992), “Turkey refused to grant the refugees official refugee status because of attendant costs and political repercussions” (p. 45). They claimed they were doing the best they could with the limited resources available. Turkey blamed the West for lecturing them about the situation, while offering little tangible help” (Gunter, 1992, p. 45).

The 1990s. Following the defeat of the Iraqi military during the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi Kurds were tempted to revolt against Saddam Hussein (DeShetler, 2000). Iraqi forces crushed the Kurdish rebellion causing more than one million Kurds to flee toward the mountains of Iran and Turkey, fearing further repercussions from Baghdad (DeShetler, 2000). President Bush ordered the United States European Forces to direct immediate relief assistance for the Kurds in the freezing remote mountains of southeastern Turkey.

On April 3, 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 687, reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in light of its unlawful invasion

and occupation of Kuwait. It also prohibited Iraq from manufacturing or using weapons of mass destruction (DeShetler, 2000).

On April 5, 1991, the U.N. passed resolution 688 condemning Iraqi oppression and asking member states to assist the Kurds and other refugees in northern Iraq with a demand for Iraq to cooperate with relief efforts (DeShetler, 2000).

The result of U.N. resolution 688 resulted in 13 nations with material contributions from 30 countries working together under the command and control of a Coalition Task Force (CTF) called Operation Provide Comfort, which began on April 7, 1991. Operation Provide Comfort had two goals: (1) to provide relief to the refugees, and (2) to enforce the security of the refugees and the humanitarian effort (DeShetler, 2000).

In October 1995, the U.N. assumed the responsibility of the humanitarian portion of Operation Provide Comfort while the CTF focused on the security portion (DeShetler, 2000). In August 1996, the KDP leadership, in response to its skirmishes with a rival Kurdish political party, invited the Iraqi army to attack the city of Irbil, controlled by the rival party. This unexpected and dangerous move placed the United States and other CTF members in an uncomfortable position (DeShetler, 2000). On September 2, 1996, all remaining CTF personnel in northern Iraq were evacuated and Operation Desert Strike was launched against Iraqi military targets in response to the attack on Irbil (DeShetler, 2000).

These events effectively ended the Operation Provide Comfort mission, however, there was still a need to monitor Iraq's activities over the no-fly zone and its production and use of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the task force's mission changed from the support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 to Resolution 687, and the transition from Operation Provide Comfort to Operation Northern Watch (ONW) began.

The following were mission statements for ONW:

- Conduct operations within Iraq, north of 36 degrees latitude
- Enforce the no-fly zone
- Monitor and survey Iraqi forces in northern Iraq to determine compliance with applicable U.N. Security Council Resolutions

ONW established two strategic goals: (1) to foster America's long-term strategic partnership with Turkey, and (2) to contain the Saddam Hussein regime. Since the beginning of ONW, Iraq interfered with any progress made by U.N. arms inspectors on three separate occasions to enforce Resolution 687, requiring Iraq to dispose of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers, and related production facilities and equipment (DeShetler, 2000).

Following the third occasion of interference in October 1998, military units in the U.S. prepared to deploy under Operation Desert Thunder. However, Iraq backed down following diplomatic negotiations and agreed to let the U.N. weapons inspectors continue their work (DeShetler, 2000).

The following month, a report citing a continued history of uncooperative actions and violations of disposal requirements for weapons of mass destruction proved to be "the straw that broke the camel's back" ((DeShetler, 2000, p. 7). Operation Desert Fox, a four-day military response, was launched in which ONW aircraft remained grounded so that Operation Desert Fox aircraft could reach targets in Iraq. A chronology of events from Desert Storm to Desert Fox is included in Appendix F.

Following the conclusion of Desert Fox, Iraq announced they would no longer observe the northern and southern no-fly zones. Therefore, when the ONW mission resumed, Iraqi air defenses took the offensive (DeShetler, 2000). Iraq began shooting at ONW aircraft with surface to air missiles (SAMs) on December 28, 1998. According to one ONW historian, this act of aggression resulted in the first delivery of ordinance -- or ammunition -- over northern Iraq by coalition forces since August 1993 (DeShetler, 2000). Since then, these SAMs, illegally being used above the 36th parallel, continue to threaten coalition aircraft and personnel, prompting aircrews to respond.

These engagements have resulted in a severe loss of Iraq's integrated air defense systems with all coalition aircraft returning safely from their missions, despite a \$14,000 bounty issued by Saddam Hussein to anyone downing a coalition aircraft (DeShetler, 2000). The participating nations of ONW signed a unilateral treaty in February 1999 signifying the United States' first multi-national rules of engagement to be followed above the 36th parallel in Iraq, still in practice at the time of this study's publication.

From June 1998 to June 1999, the Combined Task Force personnel took part in the most intense combat operations in eight years, employing 485 weapons against 225 targets using more than 5,000 combat/combat support sorties, or flying missions (DeShetler, 2000).

Media Agenda-Setting During the Persian Gulf War

Media agenda-setting was defined by Iyengar and Simon (1993) as "the ability of the news media to define the significant issues of the day" (p. 366). The researchers found the amount of news coverage devoted to various issues determines the degree of importance the

public attaches to these issues. Behr and Iyengar (1985) also found that agenda-setting was generally unidirectional, meaning news coverage affected the level of public concern, but public concern did not necessarily affect the focus of news coverage.

Iyengar and Kinder (1987) used laboratory experiments to manipulate the content of television newscasts, then showed these newscasts to study participants. The researchers found that relatively small exposures to news coverage of certain issues were sufficient to produce significant shifts in viewers' beliefs about the relative importance of particular issues. Iyengar and Simon (1993) noted this effect for both national and local issues. According to these researchers, "individuals habitually refer to issues or events 'in the news' when diagnosing certain social and political ills," (Iyengar & Simon, 1993, p. 368).

Iyengar and Simon (1993) conducted a content analysis in which they discovered the conflict in the Gulf received as much, if not more coverage than other salient issues of that time. At its peak, they found the Persian Gulf War garnered a larger share of media attention than the economy, the deficit, and drugs combined. The researchers concluded that intensive news coverage generated by a crisis issue not only elevated the prominence of the target issue, but also removed all other issues from the public's attention.

One way media agenda-setting influenced public opinion during the Persian Gulf War was through framing -- the connection between qualitative features of news about the Gulf, such as military affairs, and public opinion (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). Results of the study by Iyengar and Simon (1993) suggested that certain patterns of framing influenced the public to express greater support for a military response versus a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in the Gulf.

Framing

Framing focuses on the use of story lines, symbols, and stereotypes in media presentations, which in turn, shape public opinion about certain issues (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). According to Reese and Buckalew (1995), the media clearly played a major role in influencing public support for the Persian Gulf War. Broadcast news set up "frames of reference" (Reese & Buckalew, 1995, p. 40) toward the Persian Gulf War by supporting administrative policy and creating an "illusion of triumph" (p.40).

Kellner (1992) observed that the media acted as a conduit for government information about the Persian Gulf War. The researcher described the resulting influence on public opinion as the "militarization of consciousness" (p. 237) because military images and rhetoric dominated news coverage. Reese and Buckalew (1995) described three specific frames used to manage dissent and construct a coherent body of coverage in favor of administrative policy: the Conflict Frame, the Control Frame, and the Consensus Frame.

Conflict Frame. According to the researchers, the Conflict Frame was valued for its audience appeal. They found that news reporters and editors highlighted conflictual elements to heighten impact by focusing on confrontation, using striking visual images and dramatic soundbites.

Reese and Buckalew (1995) discovered the Conflict Frame was used to manage dissent against the Persian Gulf War by arranging a conflict between two unlike sides: anti-policy vs. pro-troops. The researchers described this as a "no-win situation for the anti-war side" (p. 47).

They also noted that although a reporter may be positioned in the middle of a controversy involving two opposing sides to provide the appearance of balance, false balance may arise when the two sides are not equal in strength. This was demonstrated by their research of the news

station's portrayal of the pro-troop or "patriotic" (p. 47) group vs. the anti-war group. They found that in the infrequent instances the station covered anti-war activities, it always balanced this coverage with pro-troop coverage.

The researchers concluded that stories using the Conflict Frame minimized the anti-war position by placing it opposite the patriotic side.

Control Frame. Reese and Buckalew (1995) described the Control Frame as being based on a close relationship between local television and law enforcement. According to the researchers, this frame aligned the station with the representatives of social order. The study showed the Control Frame presented stories from a law-enforcement point of view.

When anti-war dissent was placed in this frame, the researchers observed that those opposed to Gulf policy were perceived as a threat to social order and equated with terrorists or other criminals. They noted that no interviews were conducted with protestors, nor were attempts made to find out why the protestors were involved in the peace movement.

This research supported other scholars' claims that the media reported a limited range of information and opinion during the war, making it difficult for the American public to make independent judgments about the United States' involvement in the Persian Gulf (Bennett & Manheim, 1993; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Winter, 1991).

Consensus Frame. Reese and Buckalew (1995) noted that local television stations strive for community consensus and want to be seen as involved members of the community.

As a result, they observed that sometimes the line between community involvement and journalistic detachment is fluid. They mentioned the involvement of news personalities in charity drives and other community events as an example of this fluidity.

According to the researchers, placing stories in the Consensus Frame led reporters to identify and emphasize expressions of community solidarity. Kaniss (1991) noted that the large and fragmented audience of local television stations motivates them to seek means of establishing a sense of community through common symbols and interests.

Reese and Buckalew (1995) observed that the Consensus Frame led to distortion during the Persian Gulf War because legitimate questions were buried under warm, community feelings in news stories.

Episodic vs. Thematic Framing

According to Iyengar and Simon (1993), networks frame issues either episodically or thematically. The researchers described the episodic frame as portraying public issues in terms of concrete instances or specific events. They also observed that episodic stories make for “good pictures” (p. 369) because they are usually visually appealing and have live, on-the-scene coverage. The researchers concluded that television news coverage of political issues tends to be heavily episodic.

Iyengar and Simon (1993) found that television news coverage of the Gulf was heavily episodic or event-oriented. They noted that each day during the conflict, viewers were given the latest installment in the developing confrontation between coalition forces and Iraq.

In contrast, the researchers described the thematic news frame as one that places public issues in some general or abstract context. This frame resembles a background report examining general conditions or outcomes and usually features “talking heads” (p. 370). They observed that thematic coverage requires interpretive analysis and tends to crowd out other news items.

Iyengar and Simon (1993) noted that news stories during the Persian Gulf War were rarely thematic. They seldom provided viewers with background in the form of analysis of the causes of the conflict, historical precedents of similar territorial disputes, information about Iraqi or Kuwaiti society, or any other contextual information. Because of the limited range of information and opinion made available by the media, the American public was not able to put information about the conflict in the proper perspective or make independent judgments about the wisdom of the administration's policy (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

Iyengar and Simon (1993) observed that, under thematic framing, viewers tend to assign blame for national problems to general societal factors, such as cultural norms, economic conditions, and the actions of public officials. However, under episodic framing, the researchers found that viewers place responsibility for national problems upon the actions of particular individuals or groups. The researchers observed that exposure to episodic news programming strengthened support for a military resolution in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The researchers concluded that more-informed respondents and respondents who watched the news more frequently were most apt to favor a military solution.

Iyengar and Simon (1993) concluded that television news coverage significantly affected the American public's political concerns, as well as the criteria they used to evaluate the administration. According to the authors, "prior to the crisis, Americans were preoccupied with economic problems and crime, and their feelings toward George Bush were colored primarily by economic considerations. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf crisis became the public's paramount concern, and evaluations of George Bush became more dependent upon foreign policy considerations" (p.381).

Gap Research

According to Lentz (1991), “despite the claim that they do no more than reproduce what is happening, journalists construct reality through procedures that are quite selective” (p.16).

Tuchman argued, “To become news, an occurrence or issue must come within either a reporter’s or a news organization’s purview” (p. 14). Also, the issue or event must be “sociologically or psychologically pertinent to a reporter’s grasp of the world” (p. 14).

Strategic Silence. Lentz (1991) stated “the material that is *not* printed or broadcast may tell a historian as much as or more than what reaches the audience” (p. 10). The researcher called these editorial omissions, or the information *not* printed, “strategic silence” (p. 10).

According to Lentz (1991), strategic silence, as a concept, contains both tactic and strategy. Tactic is often an institutional process “producing images and symbols appropriate to the strategy whereby journalists make sense of the world for readers” (Lentz, 1991, p.11). The version of reality constructed by the journalist “relies upon the production of meanings based not only upon published content but upon ways in which some things are not ‘seen,’ or if seen, not recorded, as part of the social transaction between readers and creators of editorial matter (Brummett, 1980, p. 289).

Lentz (1991) observed that silence may reflect the power of ideology, customs, traditions, and mores in force at a given time rather than the true intentions of the journal or the reporter. This would explain the ruling out of information that contradicts accepted wisdom, for example “All Indians are savages;” “All women wish to marry and have children.” (Lentz, 1991, p. 11).

According to Lentz (1991), instances of strategic silence may be identified by examining “the visibility of the actors; the nature or circumstances of the event; the availability of knowledge to the writer or editor; deviations from journalistic practices; and the characteristics

of medium, genre, or particular media organization" (p. 13). When looking for strategic silence, the researcher suggested using the underlying principle that there is a "probability that the information was available but was not disseminated" (p. 12). Lentz (1991) contended that researchers can expect the search for strategic silence to yield rich insights into media content.

Tropes. In addition to strategic silence, journalists can use tropes when writing their stories to construct reality. Tropes, or figurative speech, are "an inextricable part of all discourse, be it literary, everyday, technical or journalistic" (Matera, 1991, p. 37). According to Matera (1991), "the consistent, patterned manipulation of tropes indicates style, bias, or both" (p. 37). Some examples of tropes are metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. According to Matera (1991), tropes suggest how writers compose, highlighting and hiding, thus shaping an audience's thinking.

Hausman (1989) suggested that tropes, as symbolic acts, imply the stances taken toward meaning and power in both a political and social sense. According to Arrington (1984), although tropes may operate consciously or unconsciously, there can be no doubt that they direct thinking and writing.

Two tropes, ellipsis and eclipse, have been described as important instances of editorial omission, or strategic silence (Matera, 1991). The researcher defines ellipsis as "the exclusion of obvious information such as opposing points of view or relevant and contextual data" (p. 36).

Matera (1991) describes eclipse as similar to ellipsis and typical of propaganda. Eclipse "subverts the order of importance that governs objective news reporting; it diverts the reader's attention to insignificant aspects of a story, and in some cases represents inaccuracies as facts" (p. 36).

Through the use of strategic silence and tropes, such as ellipsis and eclipse, significant gaps in media content may develop, thus shaping reality for the reader and misrepresenting events that truly took place.

Summary

Researchers have observed that the American public uses the media to discover the issues of the day and their significance (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1980; Green, 1994; Lippmann, 1922; Parenti, 1981; Vician, 1996). The amount of news coverage devoted to various political issues determines the degree of importance the public attaches to these issues (Iyengar and Simon, 1993). Media reports can significantly shape the attitudes of the American public because many people generally have little knowledge about affairs outside their personal experiences. This ability to shape public opinion gives the media a significant amount of power (Entman, 1989).

McLeod et al. (1994) attributed the public's support for the Persian Gulf War to the fact it was an external conflict, thus allowing public opinion to mobilize behind the administration. According to Kellner (1993), the media played an intermediary role in the conflict process, acting as a primary conduit of information for the American public. This enabled the media to significantly shape public opinion regarding the conflict in the Persian Gulf (Bennett & Manheim, 1993; Entman, 1989).

The media clearly played a major role in influencing public support for the Persian Gulf War by setting up "frames of reference" (Reese and Buckalew, 1995, p.40) toward conflict by supporting administrative policy and creating an "illusion of triumph" (p. 40).

The localization of the war allowed the military to use the media to conduct “safe” (p. 42) interviews with soldiers from their own communities. Local media provided a persuasive framework for support of the conflict in the Gulf because they provided ideological guidance about ways of viewing government policy and used familiar local people and organizations (Reese and Buckalew, 1995).

By placing stories within the Conflict Frame, the Control Frame, and the Consensus Frame, the media were better able to manage dissent and construct a coherent body of coverage in favor of administrative policy (Reese and Buckalew, 1995).

Iyengar and Simon (1993) found that television news coverage significantly affected the American public’s political concerns through the use of episodic framing. By using episodic framing, the media presented the American public with the day-to-day evolution of events in the Persian Gulf, without providing any background or asking probing questions regarding the administration’s policy in the region. This limited range of information and opinion during the conflict shaped public opinion by making it difficult for the American public to make independent judgments about the administration’s policy in the Persian Gulf (Bennett & Manheim, 1993; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Winter, 1991).

This study focused primarily on the use of framing, mainly the Conflict Frame, and episodic framing. The Conflict Frame uses striking images and dramatic soundbites to heighten impact (Reese & Buckalew, 1995). Episodic framing portrays public issues in terms of concrete instances or specific events (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

Also, by examining the information given to the media (the news release) vs. what was actually printed from the release (the newspaper article), the researcher was able to evaluate

whether any significant gaps in media content occurred, thus shaping reality for the reader about Operation Northern Watch and misleading the public about the events that truly took place.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Overview

Content analysis is a valuable tool in mass media research because it provides an efficient way to investigate the content of the media and answers many mass media questions (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997). According to Kerlinger (1965), content analysis is “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables” (p. 544).

The roots of modern content analysis can be traced to World War II, when Allied intelligence units carefully monitored the number and types of popular songs played on radio stations in Europe. By comparing music played on German stations to those played on other stations in occupied Europe, the Allies were able to determine changes in troop concentration throughout the continent (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997). The Allies also tracked communications between Japan and several island bases throughout the Pacific. Any increase in message volume to and from a particular base usually indicated that a new military operation was being planned involving that island (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997).

In the years following the war, content analysis was used to study propaganda in broadcast and print media. With the publication of Bernard Berelson's *Content Analysis in Communication Research* in 1952, the method was officially recognized as a tool for media researchers. A study by Tannenbaum and Greenberg (1968) found content analysis of newspapers to be the largest single category of mass communication master's theses.

Steps to Content Analysis

Wimmer and Dominick (1997) suggested that a content analysis is conducted in several “discrete stages” (p. 116). The authors outlined the following 10 steps for using content analysis as a method for conducting mass media research:

- 1) Formulate the research question or hypothesis.
- 2) Define the population in question.
- 3) Select an appropriate sample from the population.
- 4) Select and define a unit of analysis.
- 5) Construct the categories of content to be analyzed.
- 6) Establish a quantification system.
- 7) Train coders and conduct a pilot study.
- 8) Code the content according to established definitions.
- 9) Analyze the collected data.
- 10) Draw conclusions and search for indications.

The researcher systematically satisfied the above steps by formulating eight research questions. The population was defined, the unit of analysis (the article) was chosen, and categories of analysis were selected. A quantification system was then established. The researcher chose to code the content herself, therefore, no coder training was necessary. The content of the releases and the articles was coded according to established definitions provided later in this chapter. Finally, the data were analyzed, and conclusions were drawn.

This study used content analysis in the context of a case study to compare information contained in U.S. Air Force press releases about Operation Northern Watch with the information

presented in the resulting articles in three national newspapers -- the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times*. The researcher examined only the content of the releases and the articles without consideration of the effect of the information on the reader.

The content analysis covered all releases and articles generated from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of the study was posed as a research question: To what degree did the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Air Force Times* use information provided in U.S. Air Force news releases regarding Operation Northern Watch?

Eight research subquestions helped to focus the study:

1. What was the tone of the news release (positive, negative, or balanced)?
2. What was the tone of the resulting newspaper article (positive, negative, or balanced)?
3. What was the type of news release sent to the newspapers examined (hard news, feature, announcement, past-oriented, current, future-oriented)?
4. What was the type of newspaper article resulting from the news release (hard news, feature, announcement, past-oriented, current, future-oriented)?
5. What was the extent of news release usage by prestige newspapers (minimal, moderate, significant, verbatim)?
6. What was the extent of news release usage by the Air Force-related newspaper? (minimal, moderate, significant, verbatim)?

7. What kinds of sources did the three newspapers use in their articles about Operation Northern Watch (inside the Air Force, outside the Air Force/inside Department of Defense, outside the Air Force/outside Department of Defense)?
8. What was the accuracy of the content of the resulting news articles?

Population

News Releases. The researcher used a convenience sample of news releases and articles to conduct this study. The researcher examined all Air Force news releases pertaining to Operation Northern Watch dated January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999. All types of releases were considered -- announcement, created, spot news, response, feature, bad news, and other, as defined by Newsom and Carrell (1998).

News releases were posted on various U.S. Air Force Web sites, including Air Force Link, several of the nine U.S. Air Force major command Web sites (Air Combat Command, Special Operations Command, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe), the U.S. European Command Web site, and the Department of Defense Web site.

Many of the Web sites used a story format instead of the traditional news release format (a sample of each format is included in Appendix G). The researcher questioned the units about their use of the Internet to post news releases. All who used the story format said the story was used in lieu of a traditional release format (Kimberly Clow, personal communication, February 22, 2000; Bryan Holt, personal communication, February 22, 2000; Damon Stevenson, personal communication, February 22, 2000; Jackie Trotter, personal communication, February 22, 2000). Before posting releases on the unit's Web site, releases were faxed to news agencies. They also

said that faxed releases contained the Web site's address, or URL (Universal Resource Locator), to direct media to the site for more information or to review previous or future releases.

The researcher used the following key search terms to locate relevant news releases for examination: "U.S. Air Force," "Operation Northern Watch," "Iraq," "no-fly zone," "patrol," "bomb," and "U.S. troops."

Releases were matched to articles based on date and related information to determine if the release could have generated the article or contributed to the information contained in the article.

Articles. Only news articles from the front page and "Section A" of each newspaper were examined, excluding editorials and special columns. News articles from the *Air Force Times* were obtained by searching the entire publication. The researcher examined only those articles from 1997, 1998, and 1999. Articles were obtained using either the newspapers' Web site archives or Lexis Nexis. The same search terms used to locate news releases for the study were used to locate relevant articles.

Unit of analysis. The unit of analysis for both the releases and the articles was the sentence. For example, the researcher determined the tone of the release or article by evaluating each sentence contained in a paragraph and comparing them to obtain an overall rating for the paragraph. Then each paragraph was compared to obtain an overall rating of "positive," "negative," or "balanced."

Newspapers. Two of the newspapers, *The Washington Post* and *The Los Angeles Times*, are daily publications. Both are metro-sized newspapers. The researcher chose them because they are newspapers of record, they publish local, national and international stories, they represent two different areas of the United States, and they have a general audience. Another

reason these publications were selected was because they were considered prestige newspapers -- newspapers with international news gathering ability and extensive international/foreign affairs coverage (Wells & King, 1994) and ranked among the top five newspapers in daily circulation by *Editor and Publisher's International Yearbook* during the years examined.

As of March 1998, the *Washington Post* had a daily circulation of 808,884 and had the fifth largest daily circulation among all metropolitan and national newspapers, according to the Audit Bureau of Circulations. This source also reported that the *Los Angeles Times* had a daily circulation of 1,095,007 and the fourth largest daily circulation among all metropolitan and national newspapers.

The third newspaper, the *Air Force Times*, is a weekly publication and was chosen by the researcher to be a purposive sample because its content catered to a military audience. This newspaper uses a tabloid format. The content of the *Air Force Times* is not editorially controlled by the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the *Air Force Times* advertising department, its weekly circulation was 92,541.

Coding Sheet

The researcher used a one-page coding sheet (see Appendix H) to conduct this study. The coding sheet shows that each article reviewed was coded for (a) the name of the newspaper in which the article appeared, (b) format of news release, (c) news release usage, (d) the type of news release, (e) the type of article, (f) the accuracy of the article's content, (g) the tone of the news release, (h) the tone of the article, (i) the number and type of sources used in the article.

Interview Schedule

Elite interviewing was used to place the data generated from the content analysis into context. The process of elite interviewing refers to information gained through consulting experts in the field (Dexter, 1970). This form of interviewing involves "stressing the interviewee's definition of the situation; encouraging the interviewee to structure the account of the situation; and letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator's notion of relevance" (Dexter, 1970).

An interview schedule (see Appendix A) was constructed and used as a basis for comparison of responses. For this study, the researcher chose two experts who represented military views during the period coinciding with the data under study. The researcher repeatedly attempted to contact several media representatives from the Associated Press, the *Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times* to provide balanced context; however, none responded to the researcher's request for an interview. Therefore, the interview schedule contains only questions for the military experts.

The military experts interviewed were Army Colonel Gary Hovatter, the deputy director of U.S. European Command Public Affairs and Air Force Captain Michael Blass, U.S. European Command Public Affairs officer. Both were in these positions during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and throughout 1999 -- the timeframe of most releases and articles examined in this study.

The following were the interview questions posed to the military experts:

1. How does Air Force public affairs handle media relations during an on-going situation such as Operation Northern Watch?

2. How would you perceive the coverage of Operation Northern Watch stories in the print media?
3. The current study found that all releases available on the U.S. European Command Web site regarding Operation Northern were hard news. Why were there no "feature" news releases?
4. Is there internal monitoring of news release usage? If so, how is it done?
5. How does the ONW public affairs office receive the information included in news releases about Operation Northern Watch?

Intracoder Reliability

According to Wimmer and Dominick (1997), when conducting a content analysis, coding measures and procedures must be reliable for the study to be objective. Reliability exists when "repeated measurement of the same material results in similar decisions or conclusions" (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p. 126). Since the researcher was the only coder in this study, it was essential to examine intracoder reliability to determine the objectivity of the study. Intracoder reliability refers to how the same coder records the same information at different points in time.

In this study, intracoder reliability was calculated using the Holsti formula. According to Wimmer and Dominick (1983), the Holsti reliability test guards against any ambiguous categories of study and assures the coder fully understands the analysis procedure.

The Holsti formula measures reliability based on the percentage of agreement between separate tests of the same material. To determine intracoder reliability in this study, the researcher used a coding post-test. After all relevant data was recorded on the coding sheet, the

researcher used a systematic sample in which every sixth article was selected from the population and recoded using the same instrument.

Using these randomly selected subsamples, reliability for this study was determined to be 98%.

Data Collection

The following data collection procedures were used for this study.

1. The researcher first determined the availability of Air Force news releases through a variety of sources. Although releases were welcomed in any format, the researcher was only able to use on-line sources to locate news release archives. None of the organizations within the Air Force were able to send hard copies or disks containing news release archives because either they were not kept or they were unable to locate them.

In addition, the researcher was informed by many of the public affairs personnel contacted that information about events was released to the media in Air Force or major command "news service" story format instead of traditional news release format (see Appendix G for copies of each format). Most of the releases obtained from Air Force Web sites were in this news story format. Air Force public affairs personnel distributed their releases to the media and the public via their Web sites, in addition to using a fax machine. Archives of news releases were maintained on most of their Web sites for one year. Others, such as Air Force Link and Defense Link, kept them longer.

The researcher examined various U.S. Air Force-affiliated Web sites to locate releases for examination. However, not all the sites examined contained relevant information for this study. The sites that produced relevant releases were Air Force Link (www.af.mil/news), Air Combat

Command (www.acc.af.mil/news), Air Force Reserve Command (www.afrc.af.mil/news), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (www.usafe.af.mil/news), U.S. European Command (www.eucom.mil/operations/onw/index.htm), and Defense Link (www.defenselink.mil).

Although U.S. European Command and Defenselink are not limited to the U.S Air Force (the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are also represented), each sends news releases on behalf of the Air Force when the subject matter involves operations under their command. Therefore, although neither are specifically "Air Force," they were included because of the availability of news releases pertaining to Air Force events, aircraft, and personnel involved in Operation Northern Watch during the timeframe examined.

The researcher printed the appropriate releases from each Web site, cataloged the headline and date of publication of each on an Excel spreadsheet, and placed them in separate stacks by source and in chronological order starting with the earliest.

2. The researcher then determined which newspapers to examine. Because the focus of this study was on national newspapers, four newspapers were originally chosen for study – two prestige, metro-sized newspapers and two tabloid, Air Force-related newspapers. The fourth newspaper, *European Stars and Stripes*, was originally chosen because its coverage area was closest to Operation Northern Watch, based at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, and because, like the *Air Force Times*, it catered to a military audience. However, it was deleted due to the inability to access its archives.

The Arizona State University librarians determined there were no archives of *European Stars and Stripes* on file either electronically or on microfilm in the ASU library system. The researcher also examined various on-line military library sources such as the Air University Library, the Air Force Academy Library, the West Point Library, and the Army Command and

Staff College Library. Over a period of months, beginning in the "project proposal" stage, the researcher tried unsuccessfully to obtain access to the newspaper archives. Following numerous e-mails and phone calls to the newspaper's office, the head librarian for the *European Stars and Stripes*, Charlene Neuwiller, determined that the only archives in existence for this newspaper were at the office in Washington, D.C. on microfilm (personal communication, February 10, 2000).

Neuwiller was unwilling to conduct an initial search to determine how many articles were available fitting the criteria for Operation Northern Watch and the timeframe under study. As a result, the researcher was prevented from obtaining any information about the prevalence of Operation Northern Watch articles in this publication. The researcher was not able to conduct a request for articles, not knowing in advance how many there were as each article cost \$2.00 to print, or to travel to Washington, D.C. to obtain copies of the articles due to time and budget restrictions. Thus, in consultation with the chair, the researcher examined the remaining three newspapers due to the accessibility of their archives to anyone wishing to duplicate or expand on this study.

Articles from the three newspapers were located using on-line resources. For the metro-sized newspapers, the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*, the researcher first conducted a search using Lexis-Nexis. The key words used in the search for articles were "U.S. Air Force," "Operation Northern Watch," "Iraq," "no-fly zone," "patrol," "bomb," and "U.S. troops." The search generated more than 900 articles from various newspapers. Upon further examination, 26 articles were found from the *Washington Post* and 22 from the *Los Angeles Times*. Only articles from the front page and "Section A" were accepted for examination.

After using Lexis Nexis, the researcher searched the on-line archives of each newspaper individually (www.washingtonpost.com and www.losangelestimes.com) using the same key words to determine whether all relevant articles had been gathered.

Access to the on-line *Air Force Times* archives (www.airforcetimes.com) was purchased for \$15.95 and the same search terms were used to locate relevant articles for examination. In contrast to the other two newspapers, the researcher examined news articles located throughout the *Air Force Times*. The entire issue was examined because the format of the publication increased the likelihood that a relevant story could appear at any point throughout the newspaper. The researcher examined the "news hole" -- the number of column inches available for news (Itule & Anderson, 1997) -- which covered articles contained in pages 2-28. The front page of this publication is limited to "blurbs" about the stories inside.

Once all relevant articles were printed from the online sources, the researcher cataloged them according to headline, section, and date on an Excel spreadsheet. The articles were arranged into stacks by newspaper and sorted chronologically by earliest article.

3. After sorting the news releases and the articles into workable stacks, the researcher examined the spreadsheets for similar headlines and dates. Those articles that had dates within one week of a news release were paired and set aside. Further examination focused on content of the release vs. content of the article to determine the possibility of the release having generated the article. Once the researcher determined which releases could have generated which articles, both release and article were coded on the coding sheet (see Appendix H). Articles were discarded if they were located in any section other than the front page or "Section A" for the prestige newspapers, or appeared to be any type of article other than news. Also, they were

discarded if the timeframe was incorrect or the information contained in the article did not appear to come from a U.S. Air Force news release.

4. After all releases and articles were coded, the researcher analyzed the data.

Data Analysis

The researcher examined the data to compare frequencies and percentages of release usage, type of article, tone of article, and use of sources among all three newspapers individually and between types of newspapers (prestige vs. Air Force-related). The data were recorded on an Excel spreadsheet.

Research Question #1. What was the tone of the news release?

Each news release was examined to determine whether the information included in the release was positive, negative, balanced, or neutral.

- Positive: More than 50% of the sentences in the release were complimentary of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force fulfilled its intended mission, acted in self-defense, was justified in its actions, or returned to bases safely.
- Negative: More than 50% of the sentences in the release were critical of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force bombed the wrong targets, killed civilians, made

mistakes, had accidents, or wasn't justified in its actions while conducting the Operation Northern Watch mission.

- Balanced: For the purpose of this study, a release was considered balanced if upon examination of the sentences and comparison of paragraphs, its overall theme contained an equal number of positive and negative elements.

Research Question #2. What was the tone of the resulting newspaper article?

Each newspaper article determined to have resulted from a specific news release based on date and content was also examined to determine whether the information included in the article was positive, negative, balanced, or neutral.

- Positive: More than 50% of the sentences in the article were complimentary of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force fulfilled its intended mission, acted in self-defense, was justified in its actions, or returned to bases safely.
- Negative: More than 50% of the sentences in the article were critical of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force bombed the wrong targets, killed civilians, made mistakes, had accidents, or wasn't justified in its actions while conducting the Operation Northern Watch mission.

- Balanced: For the purpose of this study, an article was considered balanced if upon examination of the sentences and comparison of paragraphs, its overall theme contained an equal number of positive and negative elements.

Research Question #3. What was the type of news release sent to the newspapers being examined?

Each news release was determined to be one or more of six specific types: a) hard news; b) feature; c) announcement; d) past-oriented; e) current; f) future-oriented.

- Hard news: A release about an event that is timely and is covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Feature: A release sent about a topic of special interest (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Announcement: A release sent to inform the media about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Past-oriented: News release about an event, issue, or individual had already taken place at the time of the release (Miller, 1995)
- Current: News release about an event, issue, or individual that was on-going at the time of release (Miller, 1995)
- Future-oriented: News release about an event, issue, or individual that has not taken place at time of release (Miller, 1995).

Research Question #4. What was the type of newspaper article resulting from the news release?

Each resulting article was determined to be one or more of six specific types: a) hard news; b) feature; c) announcement; d) past-oriented; e) current; f) future-oriented.

- Hard news: An article about an event that is timely and is covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Feature: An article about a topic of special interest (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Announcement: An article about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Past-oriented: An article about an event or issue that had already taken place at the time of publication (Miller, 1995)
- Current: An article about an event or issue that was on-going at the time of publication (Miller, 1995)
- Future-oriented: An article about an event or issue that has not taken place at time of publication (Miller, 1995).

Research Question #5. What was the extent of news release usage by prestige newspapers?

The information presented in the news releases was compared to the information included in the resulting articles appearing in the two prestige newspapers. The articles were then coded by how much information they contained from the news releases: a) minimal; b) moderate; c) significant; d) verbatim.

- Minimal: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, less than 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “minimal.”
- Moderate: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “moderate.”
- Significant: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, more than 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “significant.”
- Verbatim: Using the press release word for word when writing the article.

Research Question #6. What was the extent of news release usage by the Air Force-related newspaper?

The information presented in the news releases was compared to the information included in the resulting articles appearing in the Air Force-related newspaper. The articles were then coded by how much information they contained from the news releases: a) minimal; b) moderate; c) significant; d) verbatim.

- Minimal: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, less than 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “minimal.”
- Moderate: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “moderate.”

- Significant: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, more than 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "significant."
- Verbatim: Using the press release word for word when writing the article.

Research Question #7. What kinds of sources did the three newspapers use in their articles about Operation Northern Watch?

Articles appearing in the three newspapers were examined for the kinds of sources they used in each article: a) inside the Air Force; b) outside the Air Force/inside Department of Defense; c) outside the Air Force/outside Department of Defense.

- Inside the Air Force: For the purpose of this study, these sources are members of the U.S. Air Force, either military or civilian.
- Outside the Air Force/inside the Department of Defense: For the purpose of this study, these are members of services other than the U.S. Air Force, either military or civilian, or of the Department of Defense.
- Outside the Department of Defense: For the purpose of this study, these are sources who are not members of the U.S. armed forces and who do not work for the Department of Defense.

Research Question #8. What was the accuracy of the content of the resulting news articles?

Information presented in each article was compared to the information provided in the related news release to determine if the information matched. The researcher examined the

accuracy in terms of a) who; b) what; c) where; d) when; e) why. If the article correctly conveyed four or more of the above items, the accuracy was rated as "high;" three of the criteria resulted in "moderate" accuracy; two or fewer resulted in "low" accuracy. The researcher compared the level of accuracy of articles among all three newspapers individually and among prestige vs. Air Force-related newspapers.

Definitions

The researcher consulted textbooks and other scholarly sources for definitions to the following terms. When terms were not located in these sources, the Webster's New World Dictionary of American English (3rd College Edition) was used to define the terms.

Conceptual Definitions

Conceptual definitions are terms as defined in a textbook, dictionary or other scholarly source.

Accuracy: Using the correct facts and the right words and putting things in context (Patterson & Wilkins, 1998).

Balance: Objectivity; attempting to present all sides in a news story without activist involvement or injecting partisan views; writing as dispassionately as possible (Fink, 1995).

Blurb: Title displayed on the cover (Nelson, 1987).

Content: All that is contained or dealt with in a writing or speech (Webster's, 1994).

Lexis Nexis: A commercial database that functions as a newspaper library, or morgue, where clipping files are kept under subject and reporters' bylines. Articles from various publications can be accessed by using key search terms, then printed for review (Itule & Anderson, 1997).

Metro newspaper: Newspaper containing pages approximately 15 inches wide by 23 inches deep, with 6 to 8 columns on each page. Metro is the standard page size for newspapers (Nelson, 1987)

Negative: Lacking in positive character or quality; having the effect of diminishing, depriving or denying (Webster's, 1994).

News hole: Number of column inches available for news (Itule & Anderson, 1997).

Newspaper article: A complete piece of writing that is part of a publication regularly printed and distributed, usually daily or weekly, containing news, opinions, advertisements and other items of general interest (Webster's, 1994). Types of articles examined in this study included:

- Announcement: An article about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Current: Now in progress; contemporary; at the present time (Webster's, 1994).
- Feature: An article that analyzes the news; entertains; or describes people, places or things in or out of the news (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Future-oriented: That is to be or come; of days, months or years ahead (Webster's, 1994).
- Hard news: Article about events that are timely and are covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Past-oriented: Of a former time; days months or years gone by (Webster's, 1994).

News release: The tool most often used by organizations to communicate announcements, spot news, information about special events, responses to events, features, and reactions to bad news to the public via newspapers, magazines, television, or radio (Newsom & Carrell, 1998). The types of news releases examined in this study included:

- Announcement: Sent to inform the media about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Current: Now in progress; contemporary; at the present time (Webster's, 1994).
- Feature: A release sent about a topic of special interest (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Future-oriented: That is to be or come; of days, months or years ahead (Webster's, 1994).
- Hard news: A release about an event that is timely and is covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Past-oriented: Of a former time; days months or years gone by (Webster's, 1994).

Online: Connected; information held in a computer memory that is available to searchers using computers remote from the memory unit (Itule & Anderson, 1997).

Operation Northern Watch: A combined task force, consisting of members of all branches of the U.S. military, as well as military personnel from allied nations, directed to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq and to monitor Iraqi compliance with

United Nations Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and 688

(www.eucom.mil/operations/onw/index.htm, 2000).

Positive: Tending in the direction regarded as that of progress; making a definite contribution; constructive (Webster's, 1994).

Prestige newspapers: Newspapers with international news gathering ability and extensive international/foreign affairs coverage (Wells & King, 1994).

Source: Written material or a person that a reporter uses for information (Itule & Anderson, 1997).

Tabloid newspaper: Newspaper containing pages approximately 11 inches by 15 inches, with 4 or 5 columns on each page. Tabloid pages are about half the size of metro, or standard, newspaper pages (Nelson, 1987).

Tone: A general atmosphere or a manner of expression that implies shades of coloring, nuances, emotion or personality (Moriarty, 1986).

Usage: The way words are put into action (Landau, 1975).

Verbatim: Word for word; in exactly the same words (Webster's, 1994).

Operational Definitions

Operational definitions refer to the manner in which these terms were applied in this study.

Accuracy: This study examined whether the information in the news articles was factual based on the information given in the releases.

Air Force news releases: News releases or Air Force/major command News Service stories generated by the U.S. Air Force and used to inform the media about Air Force events pertaining to Operation Northern Watch.

Air Force-related: Anything pertaining to the U.S. Air Force, its people, aircraft, events, bases, exercises, or operations.

Air Force-related newspaper: A newspaper that serves Air Force members, their families, and anyone else interested in information pertaining to the U.S. Air Force. In this study, the Air Force-related newspaper used was the *Air Force Times*.

Blurb: Title displayed on the cover (Nelson, 1987). For this study, blurbs were the titles to articles inside the *Air Force Times* displayed on its front page.

Content: In this study, the researcher examined all information contained in both the releases and articles, excluding photos and captions.

Lexis Nexis: For this study, this source was used to obtain articles from the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* for examination.

Metro newspaper: In this study, the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* were the metro newspapers used.

News hole: For the purpose of this study, the news hole examined for the prestige newspapers was the front page and "Section A." For the Air Force-related newspaper, the news hole was page 2 through page 28, on average.

Newspaper article: For the purposes of this study, the researcher examined all news articles in the *Air Force Times*, but only front page and "Section A" news articles in the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Washington Post*. The following are the types of news articles coded by the researcher:

- Announcement: An article about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Current: An article about an event, issue, or individual that was on-going at the time of publication (Miller, 1995)
- Feature: An article that analyzes the news; entertains; or describes people, places or things in or out of the news (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Future-oriented: An article about an event, issue, or individual that has not taken place at time of publication (Miller, 1995).
- Hard news: Article about events that are timely and are covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Past-oriented: An article about an event, issue, or individual had already taken place at the time of the publication (Miller, 1995)

News release: In this study, the researcher examined news releases or Air Force News Service stories generated by the U.S. Air Force and used to inform the media about Air Force events pertaining to Operation Northern Watch. The following are the types of articles coded by the researcher:

- Announcement: Sent to inform the media about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Current: News release about an event or issue that was on-going at the time of release (Miller, 1995)

- Feature: A release sent about a topic of special interest (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).
- Future-oriented: News release about an event or issue that has not taken place at time of release (Miller, 1995).
- Hard news: A release about an events that is timely and is covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997).
- Past-oriented: News release about an event or issue has already taken place at the time of the release (Miller, 1995)

Online: For this study, online sources included all Air Force Web sites used to obtain news releases, all newspaper archives used to obtain relevant articles, and Lexis Nexis.

Operation Northern Watch: For the purposes of this study, the researcher examined any article or news release during the period January 1,1997 through December 31, 1999 about activities or people involved in or supporting the patrolling of the United Nations-imposed no-fly zone over northern Iraq.

Prestige newspapers: For this study, these are newspapers ranked among the top five newspapers in daily circulation by *Editor and Publisher's International Yearbook* during the years examined.

Source: Written material or a person that a reporter uses for information (Itule & Anderson, 1997). For the purpose of this study, the following sources were coded:

- Inside the Air Force: For the purpose of this study, these sources are members of the U.S. Air Force, either military or civilian.

- Outside the Air Force/inside the Department of Defense: For the purpose of this study, these are members of services other than the U.S. Air Force, either military or civilian, or of the Department of Defense.
- Outside the Department of Defense: For the purpose of this study, these are sources who are not members of the U.S. armed forces and who do not work for the Department of Defense.

Tabloid newspaper: In this study, the *Air Force Times* was the tabloid newspaper used.

Tone: In this study, tone referred to the feeling conveyed by the words used in the release and the article.

- Positive: More than 50% of the sentences in the release or the article were complimentary of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force fulfilled its intended mission, acted in self-defense, was justified in its actions, or returned to bases safely.
- Negative: More than 50% of the sentences in the release or the article were critical of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force bombed the wrong targets, killed civilians, made mistakes, had accidents, or wasn't justified in its actions while conducting the Operation Northern Watch mission.
- Balanced: For the purpose of this study, a release or article was considered balanced if upon examination of the sentences and comparison of paragraphs, its overall theme contained an equal number of positive and negative elements.

Usage: How the releases were used by the newspapers examined.

- Minimal: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, less than 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "minimal."
- Moderate: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "moderate."
- Significant: For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, more than 10 sentences would be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "significant."
- Verbatim: For the purpose of this study, using the press release word for word when writing the article.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the use of information contained in U.S. Air Force press releases about Operation Northern Watch by three national newspapers -- the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times* from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999. The research involved a content analysis in the context of a case study, examining news articles on the front page and "Section A" of the two prestige newspapers and all news articles filling the news hole in the Air Force-related newspaper.

The search terms used to locate the relevant news releases and articles were "U.S. Air Force," "Operation Northern Watch," "Iraq," "no-fly zone," "patrol," "bomb," and "U.S. troops."

News releases and articles were compared to determine whether certain releases could have generated particular articles. If an article was determined to have been generated from a release, the two were paired and coded on a coding sheet for the following information: (a) the name of the newspaper in which the article appeared, (b) format of news release, (c) news release usage, (d) the type of news release, (e) the type of article, (f) the accuracy of the article's content, (g) the tone of the news release, (h) the tone of the article, (i) the number and type of sources used in the article, and (j) the names of the sources used in the article and their association.

The data were transferred from the coding sheets to an Excel spreadsheet to determine answers to the eight research questions.

Chapter 4

Results

The researcher used content analysis (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997) of U.S. Air Force news releases and resulting articles pertaining to Operation Northern Watch appearing in the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times* from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999 to attempt to answer the following overarching research question of this study: To what degree did the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Air Force Times* use information provided in U.S. Air Force news releases regarding Operation Northern Watch?

The results of this study are presented below with tables to illustrate the findings.

Research Question #1. What was the tone of the news releases (positive, negative, or balanced)?

For the purposes of this study, releases were coded positive if more than 50% of the sentences in the release were complimentary of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). This would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force fulfilled its intended mission, acted in self-defense, was justified in its actions, or returned to bases safely.

Releases were coded negative if more than 50% of the sentences in the release were critical of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force bombed the wrong targets, killed civilians, made mistakes, had accidents, or wasn't justified in its actions while conducting the Operation Northern Watch mission.

A release was considered balanced if upon examination of the sentences and comparison of paragraphs, its overall theme contained an equal number of positive and negative elements.

Eighty-one releases were used in the 70 articles from the three newspapers examined. The *Washington Post* used 54 releases in 47 articles, the *Los Angeles Times* used 19 releases in 18 articles and the *Air Force Times* used eight releases in five articles. Nine of the articles used more than one release – six in the *Washington Post*, one in the *Los Angeles Times*, and two in the *Air Force Times*.

The tone of the news releases coded is presented in the table below:

Table 4.1: Tone of news releases

Source of News Release	Positive	Negative	Balanced	Percent from each source
Air Force News Service	7	0	0	9%
Air Combat Command	0	0	0	0%
Defenselink	0	0	0	0%
U.S. European Command	74	0	0	91%
U.S. Air Forces in Europe	0	0	0	0%
U.S. Air Force Reserve	0	0	0	0%
Total	81	0	0	100%
Percentage/ tone	100%	0%	0%	100%

Not surprisingly, the researcher determined that all U.S. Air Force news releases used in the 70 relevant articles used a positive tone. Also, most of the news releases used by the newspapers (91%, or 74 of 81 releases) were generated from the U.S. European Command based in Stuttgart, Germany. The other 9% (7 of 81) were generated by Air Force News Service. None of the other sites examined produced releases used by the newspapers examined. Of all releases used, 91% (74 of 81) were written using the traditional news release format vs. the story format.

Research Question #2. What was the tone of the resulting newspaper articles (positive, negative, or balanced)?

For the purposes of this study, articles were coded positive if more than 50% of the sentences in the article were complimentary of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). This would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force fulfilled its intended mission, acted in self-defense, was justified in its actions, or returned to bases safely.

Articles were coded negative if more than 50% of the sentences in the release were critical of the Air Force, its people, aircraft, or operations (Miller, 1995). For the purpose of this study, this would include, but are not limited to sentences or quotations stating that the Air Force bombed the wrong targets, killed civilians, made mistakes, had accidents, or wasn't justified in its actions while conducting the Operation Northern Watch mission.

An article was considered balanced if upon examination of the sentences and comparison of paragraphs, its overall theme contained an equal number of positive and negative elements.

Seventy newspaper articles were coded – 47 (67%) from the *Washington Post*, 18 (26%) from the *Los Angeles Times*, and five (7%) from the *Air Force Times*. The tone of the articles coded is shown in the table below:

Table 4.2: Tone of articles

Newspaper	Positive	Negative	Balanced	Total	Percent of articles examined
Washington Post	30	6	11	47	67%
Los Angeles Times	8	3	7	18	26%
Air Force Times	2	0	3	5	7%
Total	40	9	21	70	100%
Percentage/tone	57%	13%	30%	100%	100%

The researcher determined that most of the articles (57%, or 40 of 70) conveyed a positive tone. Despite all news releases sent containing a positive tone, 13% of the articles were negative, while 30% were balanced. The *Washington Post* published the most articles about Operation Northern Watch of the three newspapers examined. Most of these articles (57%, or 27 of 47) appeared in the "World in Brief" section of the paper, occupying an average length of two paragraphs (see Appendix I).

Research Question #3. What were the types of news releases sent to the newspapers examined (hard news, feature, announcement, past-oriented, current, future-oriented, other)?

For the purposes of this study, a hard news release is about an event that is timely and is covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997). An announcement news release is sent to inform the media about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998). A feature news release is sent about a topic of special interest (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).

A past-oriented news release is about an event or issue that has already taken place at the time of the release (Miller, 1995). A current news release about an event or issue that was ongoing at the time of release (Miller, 1995). A future-oriented news release is about an event or issue that has not taken place at time of release (Miller, 1995).

All of the releases (100%) used by the three newspapers examined were hard news. The following tables show the types of news releases sent to all newspapers:

Table 4.3: Types of releases (hard news, feature, or announcement)

Newspaper Name	Hard News	Feature	Announcement	Total	Percentage
Washington Post	54	0	0	54	67%
Los Angeles Times	19	0	0	19	23%
Air Force Times	8	0	0	8	10%
Total	81	0	0	81	100%
Percentage/type	100%	0%	0%	100%	100%

As the table below shows, 99% (80 of 81) of the releases used by the three newspapers examined were past-oriented, and one current.

Table 4.4: Types of releases (past-oriented, current, or future)

Newspaper Name	Past-oriented	Current	Future	Total	Percentage
Washington Post	54	0	0	54	67%
Los Angeles Times	18	1	0	19	23%
Air Force Times	8	0	0	8	10%
Total	80	1	0	81	100%
Percentage/type	99%	1%	0%	100%	100%

Research Question #4. What were the types of newspaper articles resulting from the news releases (hard news, feature, announcement, past-oriented, current, future-oriented, other)?

For the purposes of this study, a hard news article is about an event that is timely and is covered almost automatically by print and electronic media (Itule & Anderson, 1997). An announcement article is written to inform the public about the marketing of a new product, the opening of a new plant, a company's latest financial results, or a new company policy (Newsom & Carrell, 1998). A feature article is written about a topic of special interest (Newsom & Carrell, 1998).

A past-oriented article is about an event or issue that has already taken place at the time of the release (Miller, 1995). A current article about an event or issue that was on-going at the time of publication (Miller, 1995). A future-oriented article is about an event or issue that has not taken place at time of release (Miller, 1995).

In each newspaper examined, most of the articles were hard news (97%). The *Washington Post* and the *Air Force Times* published one feature article each. The tables below report the types of articles examined:

Table 4.5: Types of articles (hard news, feature, or announcement)

Newspaper Name	Hard News	Feature	Announcement	Total	Percentage
Washington Post	46	1	0	47	67%
Los Angeles Times	18	0	0	18	26%
Air Force Times	4	1	0	5	7%
Total	68	2	0	70	100%
Percentage/type	97%	3%	0%	100%	100%

As the table below demonstrates, 99% of the articles were past-oriented. The *Los Angeles Times* was the only newspaper to publish a current article during the period under study.

Table 4.6: Types of articles (past-oriented, feature, or announcement)

Newspaper Name	Past-oriented	Current	Future	Total	Percentage
Washington Post	47	0	0	47	67%
Los Angeles Times	17	1	0	18	26%
Air Force Times	5	0	0	5	7%
Total	69	1	0	70	100%
Percentage/type	99%	1%	0%	100%	100%

Research Question #5. What was the extent of news release usage by prestige newspapers (minimal, moderate, significant, verbatim)?

For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, less than 10 sentences must be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "minimal." If a release is 20 sentences long, 10 sentences must be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "moderate." If a release is 20 sentences long, more than 10 sentences must be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded "significant." An article must use the news release word for word for the usage to be coded "verbatim."

From January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999, a search for Operation Northern Watch-related articles produced 117 articles -- 63 in the *Washington Post*, 36 in the *Los Angeles Times* and 18 in the *Air Force Times*. Of those articles found, 70 contained information from at least one U.S. Air Force news release -- 47 articles in the *Washington Post*, 18 articles in the *Los Angeles Times*, and five in the *Air Force Times*. The extent of news release usage by the prestige newspapers (the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*) is indicated in the table below:

Table 4.7: Extent of news release usage by prestige newspapers

Newspaper Name	Minimal	Moderate	Significant	Verbatim	Total
Washington Post	34	6	7	0	47
Los Angeles Times	14	1	3	0	18
Total	48	7	10	0	65
Percentage/usage	74%	11%	15%	0%	100%

Seventy-four percent of the articles coded (48 of 65) in the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* used less than 50% of the information contained in the news releases, thus coded as "minimal usage." None of the articles coded used the information contained in the news releases verbatim.

Fifty-four news releases were matched to the 47 articles in the *Washington Post*. Five of the articles coded in this publication each used information in two separate news releases, while one used three releases. Fifty releases were generated by U.S. European Command (www.eucom.mil/operations/ONW/index.htm), while four releases were generated by Air Force News Service on Air Force Link (www.af.mil).

Nineteen news releases were matched to the 18 articles in the *Los Angeles Times*. Of the 18 articles, one article used information found in two news releases. Seventeen of the 19 releases (89%) used by the newspaper were generated by U.S. European Command, while two news releases (11%) were generated by Air Force News Service, found on Air Force Link.

Research Question #6. What was the extent of news release usage by the Air Force-related newspaper? (minimal, moderate, significant, verbatim)?

For the purpose of this study, if a release is 20 sentences long, less than 10 sentences must be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “minimal.” If a release is 20 sentences long, 10 sentences must be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “moderate.” If a release is 20 sentences long, more than 10 sentences must be used in the resulting article for the usage to be coded “significant.” An article must use the news release word for word for the usage to be coded “verbatim.”

From January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999, a search for Operation Northern Watch-related articles in the *Air Force Times* produced 18 articles. Of these, only five articles were found to contain information from U.S. Air Force news releases. Of the five articles, three used information found in more than one news release. Each of these three articles used two separate news releases for information.

Of the five articles, two articles (40%) used minimal information (less than 50% of the information) from the U.S. Air Force press releases, one (20%) used moderate information (half of the information), and two (40%) used significant information (more than 50% of the information). None of the articles used the information in the news releases verbatim.

The extent of news release usage in the *Air Force Times* is depicted in the table below:

Table 4.8: Extent of news release usage by Air Force-related newspaper

Newspaper Name	Minimal	Moderate	Significant	Verbatim	Total
Air Force Times	2	1	2	0	5
Percentage	40%	20%	40%	0	100%

Research Question #7. What kinds of sources did the three newspapers use in their articles about Operation Northern Watch (inside the Air Force, outside the Air Force/inside Department of Defense, outside the Air Force/outside Department of Defense)?

The following table shows the sources used by the three newspapers examined:

Table 4.9: Types of sources used in articles examined

Newspaper Name	Inside Air Force	Outside AF/Inside Dept of Defense	Outside DOD	Total
Washington Post	16	59	53	128
Los Angeles Times	4	28	20	52
Air Force Times	7	6	0	13
Total	27	93	73	193
Percentage	14%	48%	38%	100%

Forty-eight percent of the sources used by the newspapers examined cited sources outside the Air Force but inside the Department of Defense. Two of the *Washington Post* articles and two of the *Air Force Times* articles cited no sources. Of the two *Washington Post* articles

without sources, one was coded “negative” and one “balanced.” Of the two *Air Force Times* articles without sources, one was “positive” and one “balanced.”

Research Question #8. What was the accuracy of the content of the resulting news articles?

The accuracy of the content in the three newspapers examined is reported in the table below:

Table 4.10: Accuracy of newspaper content based on information from news releases

Newspaper Name	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low	Total
Washington Post	23	22	2	0	0	47
Los Angeles Times	11	6	1	0	0	18
Air Force Times	5	0	0	0	0	5
Total	39	28	3	0	0	70
Percentage	56%	40%	4%	0%	0%	100%

Fifty-six percent of the articles were coded as “very high” in accuracy. Articles received an accuracy rating of “very high” if all elements of “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why” were present and correct in the article as provided in the news release. If four elements were present, the article was given a rating of “high” accuracy. For three elements, the accuracy of the article was rated as “moderate.” For two present and correct elements, the article was rated as “low” in its accuracy. If an article provided only one element of the “5Ws” present and correct, it scored an accuracy rating of “very low.”

The newspaper with the highest percentage or degree of accuracy was the *Air Force Times* with 100% of its articles containing “very high” accuracy, followed by the *Los Angeles Times* with 61% and the *Washington Post* with 49%.

Twenty of the 22 articles (91%) in the *Washington Post* coded as "high accuracy" were missing the "when" element. The other two were missing the "why" as well as the "when" element. Twenty of the 24 (83%) articles missing one or more elements of the "5Ws" were located in the "World in Brief" section.

Six of the 18 articles (33%) in the *Los Angeles Times* were also missing the "when" element. One article, in addition to missing the "when" element, had incorrectly identified a U.S. military source as an Iraqi source, thus incorrectly using the "who" element. These seven articles (39%) were in the newspaper's "World in Brief" section.

Qualitative Analysis

Two military experts were interviewed to provide context to the results of this study. Their views about media relations during Operation Northern Watch are included in the "Elite Interviews" section of the following chapter. These experts responded to the questions listed in the interview schedule in Appendix A. The transcript of their responses can be seen in Appendix J.

The experts interviewed were Army Colonel Gary Hovatter, the deputy director of U.S. European Command Public Affairs and Air Force Captain Michael Blass, U.S. European Command Public Affairs officer. Both were in these positions during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and throughout 1999, the timeframe of most releases and articles examined in this study.

Several media representatives from the Associated Press (Ankara Bureau), the *Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times* were invited to participate in the elite interviews, but none accepted.

Summary

All of the releases examined contained a "positive" tone. Nearly 60% of the articles matched to releases contained a "positive" tone, while 21% of the articles were "balanced." Less than 15% were coded "negative." All releases were "hard news," and all but one was "past-oriented." Most of the resulting articles were "hard news" and "past-oriented" also. Few "feature" articles were found during the timeframe examined.

Three out of four articles in the prestige newspapers used less than 50% of the information contained in U.S. Air Force news releases (coded "minimal"). The *Air Force Times* used minimal information as often as it used significant information (more than 50% of the release). Nearly half of the articles examined used sources outside the Air Force, but inside the Department of Defense. Air Force sources were used less than 15% of the time although Air Force aircraft and personnel were heavily involved in the operation.

Less than 60% of all articles examined were found to contain "very high accuracy," meaning all of the five W's (who, what, where, when, and why) provided in the release were present and correct in the articles. All of the *Air Force Times* articles were found to contain "very high accuracy." Sixty-one percent of the articles in the *Los Angeles Times* contained "very high accuracy," followed by less than half of the articles (49%) in the *Washington Post*.

Chapter 5

Discussion

Overview

Air Force public affairs practitioners are the “tip of the spear” of military-media relations. They are the spokespersons for the Air Force organizations they represent and interface with media representatives daily on myriad issues. In recent years, the streamlining of the Air Force, as well as the current challenges of recruiting and retention, have forced public affairs offices Air Force-wide to do more with less money and manpower. As a result, their efforts must be concentrated on the communication strategies and tactics that produce desired results. The findings of this study will hopefully provide Air Force public affairs practitioners involved in Operation Northern Watch or any other major peacetime operation with guidance on news release usage by prestige and Air Force-related newspapers so that the “Air Force story” can be better told.

Research Implications

Research shows that public relations activities, such as the use of news releases, have a significant influence on the content of newspaper articles (Arnoff, 1976; Lacy & Matusik, 1983; Martin & Singletary, 1981; Rings, 1971; Sachzman, 1976; Stoyanoff, 1987). In this study, 60% of the articles relating to Operation Northern Watch produced by key word searches contained information from at least one Air Force news release. Studies of news release usage by newspapers show usage ranging from as low as 38% to as high as 85.9% (Arnoff, 1976; Martin

& Singletary, 1981; Stoyanoff, 1987; Walters & Walters, 1992; Walters, Walters, & Starr, 1994).

The findings of this study showed that newspapers used the news releases provided more than half the time, well within the range of usage found by previous research.

Not surprisingly, all releases used by the newspapers examined used a positive tone. The goal of public affairs is “to build and maintain government and local community relations in order to influence public policy” (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000). Certainly by generating releases containing only positive information about the wartime operations during peacetime in northern Iraq, the Air Force is serving this purpose. In this study, the researcher was unable to find news releases containing negative information, such as a bomb going off target, posted on the U.S. European Command Web site that could be paired with an article. According to one of the experts interviewed in the following section, once negative information could be confirmed from the proper sources, a news release containing this information was immediately posted on the Web site. However, in the articles examined, negative information was obtained from either Pentagon-level sources or Iraqi sources vs. U.S. European Command sources. Perhaps the reason for this is the time difference between United States-based newspapers and Germany, or perhaps the media preferred the live press conference to the three or four paragraph news release.

Whatever their reasons, they chose to use the Pentagon as their U.S. source without fail when reporting negative information.

Although the “no-fly” zone was not specifically outlined in any of the three United Nations Security Council Resolutions enforced during Operation Northern Watch, more than half of the newspaper articles examined used a positive tone. Thirty percent of these articles were balanced, presenting an equal number of positive and negative elements. Therefore, despite the “no-fly” zone being basically an American imposition created to enforce the U.N. resolutions,

there was little critical discourse by the media about it, considering this choice of enforcement strategy essentially amounts to foreign armed forces (the coalition) dropping bombs on Iraqi targets over Iraqi territory without the benefit of a declared war.

This lack of critical discourse merits some discussion. First, the media's coverage of Operation Northern Watch in the newspapers examined was highly episodic. None of the news releases examined provided a history of the region, or the Kurds, which would provide context to the operation for the public. The media failed to provide this information in the articles relating to the operation, instead opting to provide the "who" and "what" elements of the story in great detail, but neglecting to provide the "why" so that the public could form a frame of reference. Because of the absence of background and context, the media failed to do their job – to provide a truthful, balanced, full and fair account of the day's events (Lowenstein & Merrill, 1990).

Since public affairs practitioners as military members fall under civilian authority, perhaps the discussion of political decisions, such as the "no-fly" zone and the protection of the Kurds is better conducted by the State Department or the White House. After all, the military can only disseminate the information it is given or allowed to provide by the National Command Authority. Public affairs practitioners can be said to be "between a rock and a hard place" because they may understand the "why" of an operation, but are forbidden from discussing the issue with the media. This can pose an ethical dilemma for members of the military public affairs profession. If they are providing the media all the information of which they are aware, then they are acting ethically. However, if they withhold information that would allow them to tell a more balanced story or to provide context, because they are ordered to do so by their superiors, are they acting unethically by following these orders? This question cuts to the heart

of the military system in the U.S., since it is dependent on a chain of command, with superiors issuing orders to subordinates and having them followed.

Another question raised by this study involved balance, both in news releases and articles. Is it a public affairs practitioner's job to provide a balanced account in a news release, or is it the media's job to search for all sides and present them to the public for review? More than half the articles examined in this study contained a "positive" tone, while only 13% contained a "negative" tone and 21% were "neutral." This emphasis on positive, rather than balanced, coverage could be the result of the symbiotic relationship shared by the military and the media. Perhaps media members fear the loss of sources if they portray the military in a negative light, or perhaps they have exhausted every avenue and found that there is only positive information to provide to readers. The lack of context in the articles when the information is readily available to anyone with the time and inclination to look for it implies that the media are using the information they can most easily and quickly acquire at the expense of a balanced and full account.

Although nearly 75% of the articles used less than half the information provided in the news releases, none contained analytical -- or "thematic" -- framing of the operation. None of the articles provided a background of the conflict or discussed the "why," so that American and international communities alike might understand the reasons for the constant bombardment of Iraqi assets over Iraqi territory by foreign armed forces. This lack of context on the media's part could be the result of staff shortages, a lack of depth and breadth of reporter's general knowledge, time constraints, or editorial directives. Whatever the reason, the media were not doing their jobs on behalf of the public in this case. In fact, the public affairs practitioners were acting more like journalists than the journalists themselves. This study found that less than half

of the articles in the *Washington Post* were "very accurate" (all five W's present and correct), while just over 60% of the articles in the *Los Angeles Times* were coded "very accurate." The media have no excuse for this lapse in accuracy since the information was provided for them in the release, and it was either used incorrectly or eliminated altogether in the articles.

Kellner (1992) observed that the media play an intermediary role in the conflict process, acting as a conduit for government information. While this was probably not a media-wide conspiracy to support the administration's position, it produced the same effect -- positive coverage with little critical discourse of the administration's position in the Middle East. This overuse of government information could have been a result of high turnover of reporters or budget cuts within media organizations, either of which would prevent the media the luxury of pursuing more sides to the story.

The mostly positive portrayal of U.S. military activities in northern Iraq showed support for administrative policy and created an "illusion of triumph" (as described by Reese and Bukalew, 1995, p. 40). The news coverage in the articles under study framed the events in a heavily episodic fashion, providing the public concrete instances or specific events, rather than "talking heads" discussing the issues and the rationale for being in northern Iraq (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). By using this episodic framing, the media presented the American and international publics with the day-to-day evolution of events during Operation Northern Watch, without providing any background or asking probing questions regarding the administration's policy in the region (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

In addition to the lack of context was also a lack of the "human" angle. None of the releases resulting in news articles were "feature" releases, and only two of the articles examined were features. While the U.S. European Command refused to use feature releases because of

concerns for the safety of the personnel involved in the operation, other commands posted feature releases freely on their publicly accessible Web sites. Although none of these feature releases generated feature stories in the articles examined, the information was readily available to anyone, friend or foe, who chose to seek it. This lack of consistency in the concern for security generated questions regarding the validity of the claim that feature releases and resulting articles posed a threat to the safety of the troops participating in Operation Northern Watch.

Elite Interviews

The military experts interviewed were Army Colonel Gary Hovatter, the deputy director of U.S. European Command Public Affairs and Air Force Captain Michael Blass, a U.S. European Command Public Affairs officer. Both were in these positions during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and throughout 1999 -- the timeframe of most releases and articles examined in this study. These experts were in positions to either make decisions about media relations during the operation or to carry out those decisions, and served as the spokesmen for the military in Operation Northern Watch during this time. The questions posed to the two experts are in Appendix A. The transcripts of their responses are in Appendix J.

According to Blass (personal communication, May 1, 2000), media operations during Operation Northern Watch were conducted differently than media relations in other operations because the U.S. armed forces were guests on Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Since the base was not owned by the United States, Air Force public affairs personnel had to request Turkish General Staff approval before bringing any media members on the base -- a lengthy process.

While keeping the public informed about Operation Northern Watch was important, the primary goal of public affairs in ONW was not to promote it, but to ensure the media received

accurate information, especially when Baghdad made false claims of U.S. wrong-doing (Mike Blass, personal communication, May 1, 2000). Hovatter described the main goals of Operation Northern Watch: (1) to highlight that coalition forces were not waging war, but trying to peacefully enforce the internationally recognized no-fly zone; (2) to explain that the coalition's use of force was driven by its right to defend itself against Saddam Hussein's attacks on them; (3) to highlight that when force was used, it was done with restraint and with no intent to harm innocent civilians; and (4) to "go ugly early" -- that is to take immediate responsibility for unintended collateral damage (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

Blass explained that host nation sensitivities precluded the desire the see front page coverage of the operation (personal communication, May 1, 2000). Other factors that affected public affairs activities during Operation Northern Watch were coalition sensitivities, the geographical location of the operation resulting in media expense to cover it, the Kurds, the oil pipeline shared by Turkey and Iraq, the sanctions debate, and the lack of a clearly defined endpoint of the operation itself (Gary Hovatter, personal communication, April 21, 2000).

While discussing the foundation for his public affairs actions during Operation Northern Watch, Hovatter explained, "Increasingly, it seems the military is being [sic] expected to make its operations 'popular.' When did that become a military mission? We should tell the truth about what we do and, to a certain extent, can and should seek to highlight activities we believe honestly portray the best about what we do" (personal communication, April 21, 2000). As mentioned previously, the military can only do as much as its civilian bosses allow. Hovatter observed, "The military doesn't send itself anywhere, our civilian masters do. And it's they who need to sell the American people that what they have directed the military to do is important and

is, potentially, worth the blood of their sons and daughters" (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

The experts believed the media's coverage of ONW to be balanced, but shallow, especially considering the previously mentioned collateral issues, such as Turkish-Iraqi relations and the sanctions debate (Gary Hovatter, personal communication, April 21, 2000). Hovatter commented, "I consider the media largely uninterested, driven, somewhat paradoxically, more by ONW's success at successfully launching so many sorties [aircraft missions] over such a long period of time and without losses." In his opinion, he felt the print media gave them credit for honesty. Blass said, "The media considers ONW routine and unless something happens, like a plane getting shot down, media interest will remain low" (personal communication, May 1, 2000).

According to Hovatter, only a few media outlets routinely paid attention to Operation Northern Watch, unless an unusual event occurred. "We do our press releases within minutes of the conclusion of a flying window. The result is that we rarely get direct media queries since the media who are interested know our [Web] site and go there. They also know that what they see on our Web site is about all we intend to say" (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

While the enforcement of the no-fly zone is not specifically established in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions supported by Operation Northern Watch, it isn't prohibited either. Hovatter explained that unless strictly prohibited by one of the resolutions, the no-fly zone was an acceptable means of implementing the resolutions. However, he noted, "While ONW is not part of the sanctions regime against Iraq, it has become intrinsically linked with it as an expression of continued pressure on Iraq...As a result, it is rare to see a sanctions story that does

not include mention of ONW...To that extent, there is critical coverage, but...not any depth” (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

Blass explained that the news release used by the U.S. European Command had changed during the past few years of the operation, depending on host nation sensitivities and the preferences of commanders in charge at the time. Feature releases were not sent from U.S. European Command because of concerns for the security of personnel involved in the operation. Hovatter explained, “Saddam Hussein has put a bounty on aircrews. Why would we want to give him names and faces to focus on? Even for non-aircrew, why tempt fate by giving the ‘threat’ a target?” (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

However, if the media requested subjects for feature stories, Hovatter said the decision to be interviewed was left to the individual military member. Some issues, driven by operational security concerns, were not discussed with the media. Also, media members were only allowed to fly on training missions, not operational missions, which, according to Hovatter, caused some “hissy fits” on occasion (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

Hovatter commented that the biggest problem in the public affairs business is determining measures of effectiveness. He questioned the utility of monitoring news releases for success. “What constitutes a successful release about a truly ugly event? Balance and fairness is [sic] probably the measure, but what about less black and white events, or even good news releases? How ‘good’ does the resulting coverage have to be to be considered successful? And if coverage isn’t ‘successful?’ Then what? Throw more truth at them? Call their editors? Blacklist the reporter?” (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

According to Hovatter, although it appears the Pentagon released all information regarding collateral damage -- or other bad news -- first, in reality, U.S. European Command

public affairs already posted a release on their Web site. "It may appear they are announcing it because the Pentagon press (forgive the hyperbole) tend to believe all things are known first at the Pentagon. That's really not fair because many of them [the media] scan our Web pages daily," he said. "The flying windows often dictate that we put out our release while the U.S. morning papers are hitting the street...This creates the largely inaccurate impression that the Pentagon is breaking the news...when they are really repeating it" (personal communication, April 21, 2000).

From the experts' descriptions of the public affairs business in Operation Northern Watch, telling the operation's story was obviously riddled with challenges, including operational and personnel security, host nation sensitivities, time zone differences, and refuting claims of collateral damage by Baghdad. Because content analysis can only answer the "what," their comments and observations will hopefully help others to understand the "why." Both expressed a belief that their way of conducting business was as honest and full as security concerns would allow. In fact, although all the releases sent from the command were coded "positive," Hovatter expressed the belief that the truth should be told no matter how ugly. From an ethical standpoint, the practice of public affairs during Operation Northern Watch was more commendable than the practice of journalism.

Recommendations for Future Studies

When this study was conducted, the researcher was unable to locate any previous research on this particular operation, perhaps since it was on-going at the time. Because of the lack of existing research on Operation Northern Watch, this content analysis produced many questions about military-media activities during an operation of this nature. Future studies

addressing these questions will help military public affairs practitioners to increase the effectiveness of their public affairs practices during military operations other than war.

Most of the news releases used were generated from U.S. European Command and were written in a traditional news release format vs. a story format. Future studies could include a measure of types of news releases used on a variety of issues, not just on-going operations, to measure which format of news release generates more articles.

This study found that only hard news releases were used by the national newspapers, resulting in mostly hard news articles. The results suggested that national newspapers were not interested in humanized stories, but instead gravitated toward short, specific hard news stories. A replication of this study could be accomplished analyzing local newspapers as opposed to national ones to determine what types of releases were used and the tone of articles published. In addition to print media, a replication of this study could also be undertaken examining the broadcast media's use of news releases, as well as tone, accuracy and use of sources.

The current study examined only the content of the releases and articles without regard to their effect on public opinion. Perhaps a triangulation of this study could incorporate a measure of public opinion about Operation Northern Watch, in addition to a content analysis, to determine how coverage is influencing public opinion regarding the operation.

Another suggestion for future research is to survey journalists who cover Air Force issues about their opinions of Air Force news releases, as well as public affairs practices in general. The findings of this study could be used to improve military-media relations for future operations, as well as for day-to-day operations.

A final recommendation for future study results from the current concerns of the Air Force with recruiting quality people and retaining the highly trained professionals already in the

Air Force. Perhaps a study could be conducted evaluating the placement of stories by Air Force news releases and their affect on Air Force recruiting efforts. One hypothesis would be that more positive media coverage would help recruiting efforts, while negative coverage would hinder it. Considering the Air Force increased its advertising budget during 2000, recruiting efforts are at an all-time high. Air Force news releases could be a helpful addition to the recruiting effort that wouldn't require an increase to the already significant television advertising budget of \$28.5 million.

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Appendix A

Interview Schedule

Interview Schedule


The following were the interview questions posed to the military experts:

1. How does Air Force public affairs handle media relations during an on-going situation such as Operation Northern Watch?
2. How would you perceive the coverage of Operation Northern Watch stories in the print media?
3. The current study found that all releases available on the U.S. European Command Web site regarding Operation Northern were hard news. Why were there no "feature" news releases?
4. Is there internal monitoring of news release usage? If so, how is it done?
5. How does the ONW public affairs office receive the information included in news releases about Operation Northern Watch?

Appendix B

Air Force organizational structure

Figure 2.6. Department of the Air Force.



Appendix C

Principles of Information



Go

PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.

Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out the policy, the following principles of information will apply:

- Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classifications. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.*
- A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.*
- Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.*
- Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.*
- The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.*

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has the primary responsibility for carrying out this commitment.

1 April 1997

(signed)

Date



William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

Appendix D

Map of Operation Northern Watch area



Appendix E

United Nations Resolutions 678, 687, 688



**United
Nations**

S/RES/0678 (1990)
29 November 1990

RESOLUTION 678 (1990)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting on 29 November 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling, and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August (1990), 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990.

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



United Nations

S/RES/687 (1991)

8 April 1991

RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting,
on 3 April 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,

Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),

Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991).

Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932.

Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972.

Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,

Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in

<http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm>

the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,

Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

Deplored threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,

Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;

A

2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;

3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;

4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

B

5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

C

7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:

(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;

(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;

11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;

12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;

D

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

E

16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;

19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above;

F

20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;

21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;

23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;

24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;

(b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;

(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements;

26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;

27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;

28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;

29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions:

G

30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;

31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

H

32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;

I

33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.



United Nations

S/RES/0688 (1991)
5 April 1991

RESOLUTION 688 (1991)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991

The Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations,

Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved, Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of Turkey and France to the United Nations dated 2 April 1991 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22435 and S/22442),

Taking note also of the letters sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436 and S/22447),

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area,

Bearing in mind the Secretary-General's report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366),

1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;

3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities;
5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population;
6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts;
7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Appendix F

Desert Fox timeline

CHRONOLOGY From DESERT STORM to DESERT FOX

1991 -- Following the end of DESERT STORM in March, Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq rebel, but are defeated by Iraq's elite Republican Guard. This is followed by a Kurdish insurrection that is also defeated. The United States, Great Britain and France create a safe haven for the Kurds north of the 36th parallel and ban Iraqi planes from the area.

1992 -- In August, the United Nations establishes a no-fly zone along the 32nd parallel after Iraq launches renewed attacks against Shiite Muslims. The United States and its allies begin patrolling the no-fly zone, operations which continue today. In December, the U.S. planes intercept and shoot down an Iraqi MIG-25 that violates the no-fly zone.

1993 -- In January, the United States accuses Saddam Hussein of moving missiles into southern Iraq. Iraq refuses to remove the missiles. Allied planes and ships attack the missile sites and a nuclear facility near Baghdad. In June, following the discovery of a plot to assassinate former President George Bush, U.S. ships fire 24 cruise missiles at intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.

1994 -- Saddam Hussein moves Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border. The forces withdraw after the United States deploys a carrier group, warplanes and 54,000 troops to the Persian Gulf region.

1996 -- In August, Saddam Hussein sends forces into northern Iraq and captures city of Irbil, a key city inside the Kurdish haven established above the 36th parallel in 1991. The following month, U.S. ships and airplanes attack military targets in Iraq to punish the Iraqi military and President Clinton extends the southern no-fly zone to just south of Baghdad.

1997 -- In October, a protracted confrontation with Saddam Hussein begins after Iraq accuses U.S. members of the U.N. inspection teams of being spies and expels the majority of U.S. participants. The U.N. Security Council threatens renewed economic sanctions. The confrontation continues into November as Iraq expels the remaining six U.S. inspectors and the United Nations withdraws other inspectors in protest. Inspectors are readmitted after the United States and Great Britain again begin a military build-up in the Gulf. However, later in November, Iraq announces it will not allow inspectors access to sites designated as "palaces and official residences." U.N. officials protest, having long suspected that such sites were being used to conceal possible weapons of mass destruction.

1998 -- The tensions that began in October 1997 continue. In February, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan works out an agreement with Iraq that resumes weapons inspections. In turn, Iraq receives promises the United Nations will consider removing its economic sanctions. Inspections continue into August, when Iraq cuts ties with weapons inspectors, claiming it has seen no U.N. move toward lifting sanctions.

The Final Days

October 31 -- Iraq cuts off all work by U.N. monitors. The United States and Great Britain warn of possible military strikes to force compliance. A renewed military build-up in the Persian Gulf begins.

November 5 -- The U.N. Security Council condemns Iraq for violating agreements signed after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

November 11 -- The United Nations withdraws most of its staff from Iraq.

November 14 -- With B-52 bombers in the air and within about 20 minutes of attack, Saddam Hussein agrees to allow U.N. monitors back in. The bombers are recalled before an attack occurs. Weapons inspectors return to Iraq a few days later.

December 8 -- Chief U.N. weapons inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq is still impeding inspections. U.N. teams begin departing Iraq.

December 15 -- A formal U.N. report accuses Iraq of a repeated pattern of obstructing weapons inspections by not allowing access to records and inspection sites, and by moving equipment records and equipment from one site to another.

December 16 -- The United States and Great Britain begin a massive air campaign against key military targets in Iraq.

Appendix G

Sample news releases



Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND (15 June 1999) -- Between approximately noon and 1:30 p.m. Iraqi time today, Operation Northern Watch (ONW) aircraft detected Iraqi radar and were fired upon by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery. Responding in self-defense, U.S. Air Force F-16C Fighting Falcons and F-15E Strike Eagles dropped GBU-12 precision guided ammunitions on Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites southeast of Mosul.

Damage to Iraqi forces is currently being assessed. All coalition aircraft departed the area safely.

Coalition aircraft have been enforcing the Northern No-fly Zone for more than eight years. Since Dec. 28, 1998, Saddam Hussein has opted to challenge this enforcement by targeting coalition aircraft with radar, surface-to-air missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery. Operation Northern Watch aircraft will respond in self-defense to these threats while continuing to enforce the no-fly zone.

The Combined Task Force Combined Information Bureau can be reached at 90-322-316-3704 or DSN: 314-676-3704

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Updated 16 August 1999 15:55

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77th FS 'Gamblers' successful at Operation Northern Watch

Released: 7 Jun 1999

by Staff Sgt. Cindy York
Combined Task Force/Operation Northern Watch Public Affairs

INCIRLIK AIR BASE, Turkey (AFPN) -- With about 45 days at Operation Northern Watch, the 77th Fighter Squadron "Gamblers" from Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., are starting to feel like the old kids on the block. There are only two other flying units that have been here longer than the 77th, and new units often stop by to ask questions of the "seasoned" Gamblers.

"Other units come to get a feel for operations until they get settled. Usually they want to know what threats to expect, where we've seen them before and how we integrate the different platforms," said the 77th deployed commander, who, for security reasons, is identified only as "Stitch."

Flying F-16CJs, the Gamblers definitely have a feel on the mission here. They've flown more than 200 ONW sorties and 720 hours since they arrived in mid-April.

The commander said flying missions in a joint environment affords them opportunities not known to pilots at Operation Southern Watch. Here, each day there is a mass briefing with everyone, including people from tanker, fighter and intelligence units.

"The air tasking order drives all operations, but ONW is unique. This is as joint as it gets with all four services, so seeing everyone in the briefs each day is a huge advantage. If we need to change tactics, we do it face-to-face, real time," he said.

This may not be considered a training environment, but the Gamblers are still working on training and upgrades, even while flying combat missions. They've certified two flight leads, a mission commander and completed instructor pilot upgrades. They recently had two lieutenants fly combat missions together, a feat the commander can't remember happening before in the squadron.

The maintenance troops are just as successful, according to Chief Master Sgt. Dan Kane, Gambler maintenance superintendent.

"Each shop is doing an outstanding job. There hasn't been a single weapons malfunction," he said. "The phase shop is also doing great work. They've completed the 200-flying hour phase inspection on five of our eight aircraft."

Kane said the jets need the inspections much sooner here because of the length of the sorties. Since the average mission is five hours, a jet goes to phase in an average of two to three months, instead of the seven it would take at their home unit.

Master Sgt. Gregory Stewart, 77th production superintendent, attributes



Senior Airman Ray Lloyd, crew chief with the 77th Fighter Squadron, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., inspects an F-16 aircraft intake. The 77th is deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in support of Operation Northern Watch. (Photo by Senior Airman Gary Guese)

their success to a team effort.

"Everything is on track. Our maintenance is updated and we haven't lost an ONW sortie to date. It's a combined effort with everyone from the specialists and weapons, to the crew chiefs and the back shop," he said.

Airman 1st Class Christopher Edwards, a Gambler crew chief, said although this is his first time here, the job feels routine.

"When I crew a jet, the pilot goes up and he needs to come back safe, no matter what kind of mission he's flying. The jet needs to be ready the same for every mission."

With the days off scattered here and there, 77th people are making the most of their time off-duty, but also enjoying their time on the flightline.

Airman 1st Class Albert Saavedra, 77th maintenance scheduler, said his first temporary duty assignment has taught him a lot already.

"I have more of an understanding of everyone else's jobs. Back home, I schedule a job for a jet and never know why it takes the time it does," he said. "Here, I work closely with everyone and I see what they do and how they do it."

Senior Airman Cynthia Vetter, a maintenance analyst deployed from the 20th Operations Support Squadron, said she values her time at ONW.

"At Shaw, I sit in front of a computer and talk to people. I'm doing some of that here too, but, this is a wartime situation and I feel like I am making a difference."

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
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An F-16 pilot with the 77th Fighter Squadron, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., does a preflight munitions inspection before flying a mission. The 77th is deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in support of Operation Northern Watch. (Photo by Senior Airman Gary Guese)



F-16 crew chiefs with the 77th Fighter Squadron Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., expertly move around the aircraft as they ready it for a flying mission. The 77th is deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in support of Operation Northern Watch. (Photo by Senior Airman Gary Guese)



An F-16 sits inside a hardened aircraft shelter at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The aircraft is with the 77th Fighter Squadron, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., deployed to help enforce the no-fly zone over northern Iraq as part of Operation Northern Watch. (Photo by Senior Airman Gary Guese)

Appendix H

Coding sheet

Coding Sheet

(1) Article Headline _____

(2) Publication Date (Month/Day/Year) _____ (3) Section/Page Number _____

(4) Generated by specific release? _____
If yes, release headline? _____

(5) Format of Release:

Traditional _____
Story _____

(6) Newspaper:

- 01. Washington Post
- 02. Los Angeles Times
- 03. Air Force Times

(7) News Release Usage:

- 01. Minimal (less than half)
- 02. Moderate (half)
- 03. Significant (more than half)
- 04. Verbatim

(8) Type of Release:

- 01. Hard News
- 02. Feature
- 03. Announcement
- 04. Past-oriented
- 05. Current
- 06. Future-oriented
- 07. Other

(9) Type of Article:

- 01. Hard News
- 02. Feature
- 03. Announcement
- 04. Past-oriented
- 05. Current
- 06. Future-oriented
- 07. Other

(10) Tone of Release:

- 01. Positive
- 02. Negative
- 03. Balanced

(11) Tone of Article:

- 01. Positive
- 02. Negative
- 03. Balanced

(12) Accuracy of Content:

- 01. Who
- 02. What
- 03. When
- 04. Where
- 05. Why

(13) Number of Sources Used in Article:

- 01. Inside Air Force _____
- 02. Outside AF/Inside
DoD _____
- 03. Outside DoD _____

Appendix I

Sample “World in Brief” article from each newspaper



HEADLINE

Home | Discussions | Print Edition | Archives | Site Map | Home Delivery | Advertise | Help



Wednesday, April 28, 1999

Home Edition

Section: PART A

Page: A-4

World IN BRIEF / IRAQ

Baghdad Says Attack Killed 4 Civilians

By: From Times Wire Reports

Allied warplanes killed four civilians in northern Iraq, the official Iraqi News Agency reported. The planes struck public utilities and weapons sites in the Mosul region, leading "to the martyrdom of four citizens and the wounding of others," the agency said, quoting the Iraqi armed forces. An American military official in Germany said U.S. warplanes attacked antiaircraft and radar sites after being fired on while patrolling the Western-imposed "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq. "Operation Northern Watch planes detected Iraqi radar and observed Iraqi antiaircraft fire posing a threat to coalition aircraft," a spokeswoman for the U.S. European Command said.

Type of Material: News Brief; Wire Service Story

Descriptors: UNITED STATES -- MILITARY ASSAULTS -- IRAQ; UNITED STATES -- FOREIGN RELATIONS -- IRAQ; UNITED STATES -- ARMED FORCES -- PERSIAN GULF; UNITED NATIONS -- IRAQ; IRAQ -- GOVERNMENT; WEAPONS INSPECTIONS; CIVILIAN CASUALTIES;

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January 13, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION: Pg. A18: WORLD IN BRIEF

LENGTH: 918 words

HEADLINE: WORLD IN BRIEF

BODY:

THE MIDDLE EAST

U.S. Warplane Fires Missile at Iraqi Radar

A U.S. warplane fired a missile at a radar site in a Western-imposed "no-fly" zone in northern Iraq yesterday, the second such incident in two days, as tension rose in the Persian Gulf area. The attack took place as Iraq stepped up a verbal blitz against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, accusing them of conspiring with the United States and Britain against Iraq.

U.S. Lowers Profile in Peace Talks

TEL AVIV -- The United States, which brokered the last two interim peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, will play a much less active role in talks on a permanent accord, the chief U.S. negotiator said.

"Permanent status is not something that should be mediated," said U.S. envoy Dennis Ross. A final peace agreement would draw the border between Israel and the Palestinian entity and determine the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and Palestinian refugees.

THE AMERICAS

Colombian President Warns Rebels on Talks

BOGOTA, Colombia -- President Andres Pastrana said he would break off fledgling peace talks with Colombia's top Marxist guerrilla group if it made good on threats to kidnap leading politicians to press its demands. Jorge Briceno, the military mastermind of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), said over the weekend that he might seize lawmakers to force the government to agree on a

Appendix J

Interview transcripts

Interview with Colonel Gary Hovatter, U.S. Army, U.S. European Command Public Affairs, Stuttgart, Germany

Question #1: How does Air Force public affairs handle media relations during an on-going situation such as Operation Northern Watch?

Answer #1: FIRST, UNDERSTAND THAT PART OF THE PHILISOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR MY PAO ACTIONS IS THE BELIEF THAT WHEN THE PRESS IS PRESENT, NOTHING IS TACTICAL. PUT ANOTHER WAY, IF THE PRESS ARE ON YOUR "BATTLEFIELD" (AND THEY ARE), YOUR ACTIVITIES ARE BEING WATCHED, AND GRADED, IN REAL TIME/NEAR REAL TIME BY STRATEGIC AUDIENCES WITH THE POWER TO DECLARE YOUR OPERATION/EVENT A FAILURE.

ANOTHER BASIC HOVATTER TENET: THE U.S. STRATEGIC NATIONAL CENTER OF GRAVITY HAS NEVER CHANGED IN THE ENTIRE 2+ CENTURIES OF OUR EXISTENCE, I.E., THE WILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE EXPENDITURE OF AMERICAN BLOOD AND TREASURE.

MY FINAL HOVATTER TENET (MAYBE): INCREASINGLY, IT SEEMS THE MILITARY IS BEING EXPECTED TO MAKE ITS OPERATIONS "POPULAR". WHEN DID THAT BECOME A MILITARY MISSION? WE SHOULD TELL THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT WE DO AND, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, CAN AND SHOULD SEEK TO HIGHLIGHT ACTIVITIES WE BELIEVE HONESTLY PORTRAY THE BEST ABOUT WHAT WE DO. BUT THE MILITARY DOESN'T SEND ITSELF ANYWHERE, OUR CIVILIAN MASTERS DO. AND IT'S THEY WHO NEED TO SELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT WHAT THEY HAVE DIRECTED THE MILITARY TO DO, IS IMPORTANT AND IS, POTENTIALLY, WORTH THE BLOOD OF THEIR SONS AND DAUGHTERS. IT WOULD BE INCREDIBLY DANGEROUS FOR THE MILITARY TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING OUR OPERATIONS/WARS POPULAR.

WITH REGARD TO ONW, SEVERAL FACTORS THAT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT PAO [Public Affairs Office] ACTIVITIES:

--HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES: TURKEY IS A COUNTRY THAT HAS CONCERNS ABOUT CONDUCTING MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM TURKISH SOIL AGAINST A NEIGHBOR. THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT VOTES ON RENEWING ONW'S ACTIVITIES EVERY 6 MONTHS.

--COALITION SENSITIVITIES: ALTHOUGH THE COALITION IS NOW JUST THE U.S., U.K., AND TURKEY, THE U.K. DOES HAVE CERTAIN NATIONAL SENSITIVITIES THAT VARY FROM OURS. THESE HAVE TO BE FACTORED IN.

--GEOGRAPHICALLY, ONW AT INCIRLIK IS OFF THE BEATEN PATH FOR THE PRESS...AND EXPENSIVE. THIS MEANS THERE ARE FEW MEDIA SIMPLY "PASSING THROUGH".

--TURKEY SHARES CONCERNS WITH IRAQ, AMONG THEM: THE KURDS AND THE IRAQI OIL PIPELINE.

--THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT IN THE UN WITH ONW/OSW AND THE SANCTION REGIME, E.G., THE SECGEN [Secretary General], GENERAL MEMBERSHIP, AND SOME PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

--THE LACK OF A CLEARLY DEFINED U.S. "ENDSTATE" FOR ONW (AND, FOR THAT MATTER, OSW), I.E., WHEN IS ONW "OVER"? WHILE THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OWN OR EUROCOM HAS TO ANSWER (WE CONDUCT THE OPERATION BECAUSE WE'VE BEEN TOLD TO), LACK OF CLEARLY DEFINED ENDSTATES IS A PROBLEM IN ANY MILITARY OPERATION. WHAT DO WE GAIN BY GOING OUT OF OUR WAY TO CONTINUALLY HIGHLIGHT THIS OPERATION?

--OUR MAIN GOAL(S) [are to] HIGHLIGHT THAT OUR FORCES ARE NOT WAGING WAR, BUT ARE SEEKING TO PEACEFULLY ENFORCE THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED NORTHERN NO-FLY ZONE.

--HIGHLIGHT THAT OUR USE OF FORCE IS DRIVEN BY OUR RIGHT/NEED TO DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST SADDAM'S ATTACKS ON OUR FORCES (THEY DON'T ATTACK/THREATEN, WE DON'T ATTACK THEM).

--HIGHLIGHT THAT, WHEN WE DO USE FORCE, IT IS DONE WITH RESTRAINT AND WITH NO INTENT TO HARM INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

--HIGHLIGHT ONW'S MISSION IS NOT TO "GET" SADDAM OR DESTROY HIS MILITARY.

--GO UGLY EARLY, I.E., TAKE IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNINTENDED COLLATERAL DAMAGE.

ONW IS ON A TURKISH BASE AND MEDIA DO NOT HAVE ACCESS UNTIL/UNLESS THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF AND/OR GOVERNMENT SAY "OKAY". THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SAY "OKAY" CAN VARY CONSIDERABLY FROM WEEK TO WEEK. THAT SAID, THIS IS NOT AT ALL UNIQUE TO TURKEY OR ONW. WE ALWAYS HAVE TO FACTOR IN HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES.

ABSENT AN UNUSUAL EVENT, ONLY A HANDFUL OF MEDIA ROUTINELY PAY ATTENTION TO ONW, E.G., AP, REUTERS, AND, VIA THEIR BAHGDAD BUREAU, CNN. ALSO, WE DO OUR PRESS RELEASES VIA THE INTERNET (EUROCOM'S HOME PAGE), OFTEN WITHIN MINUTES OF THE CONCLUSION OF A FLYING WINDOW. THE RESULT IS THAT WE RARELY GET DIRECT MEDIA QUERIES SINCE THE MEDIA WHO ARE INTERESTED KNOW OUR SITE AND GO THERE. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT WHAT THEY SEE ON OUR WEB SITE IS ABOUT ALL WE INTEND TO SAY.

INTERVIEWS ARE RARELY A PROBLEM. WE DO FACTOR IN OPSEC, E.G., SADDAM HAS PUT A BOUNTY ON THE HEADS OF ONW AIRCREW. AS A RESULT, WE LEAVE IT UP TO THE INTERVIEWEE IF HE/SHE WANTS TO BE ANONYMOUS, USE ONLY THEIR NICKNAME, OR GO WITH THEIR FULL NAMES. CERTAINLY THERE ARE SOME ISSUES WE WILL NOT DISCUSS, MOSTLY DRIVEN BY OPSEC [operational security]. ALSO, MEDIA ARE NOT

PERMITTED TO FLY ON OPERATIONAL (VS. TRAINING) AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] FLIGHTS. THIS HAS CAUSED SOME "HISY FITS" ON OCCASION.

Question #2: How would you perceive the coverage of Operation Northern Watch stories in the print media?

Answer #2: FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, ONW IS LARGEY INVISIBLE WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE SORTIE RATE AND LEVEL OF IRAQI ADA ACTIVITY. THE COVERAGE IS LARGEY FORMULAIC, I.E., IRAQ SHOOTS, WE BOMB (OR NOT), THEY ACCUSE US OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND WE EITHER ADMIT IT (IF WE DID IT, WE ALMOST ALWAYS BEAT THE IRAQIS TO THE PUNCH BY ANNOUNCING OUR ERROR BEFORE THEY CAN) OR (IF WE DIDN'T DO IT) DENY. PERHAPS A BETTER WAY TO CHARACTERIZE IT IS GENERALLY BALANCED, BUT VERY SHALLOW. THE COVERAGE OF COLLATERAL ISSUES (TURKISH-IRAQI RELATIONS, THE SANCTIONS DEBATE, ETC.) IS, I THINK, MORE INTERESTING.

I CONSIDER THE MEDIA LARGEY UNINTERESTED, DRIVEN, SOMEWHAT PARADOXICALLY, MORE BY ONW'S SUCCESS AT SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHING SO MANY SORTIES OVER SUCH A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AND WITHOUT LOSSES. THAT SAID, I THINK THE PRINT MEDIA LARGEY GIVE US FULL CREDIT FOR HONESTY. IT'S PROBABLY A BIT UNFAIR TO COMPARE PRINT WITH TV SINCE, QUITE SIMPLY, VIDEO OF ONGOING OPERATIONS IS VERY RARE. ABSENT PICTURES, TV PRESS DOESN'T HAVE A STORY.

WHILE THERE IS NO UN-SPECIFIED NO-FLY ZONE, THE NFZ WAS CHOSEN AS A METHOD FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INTENT OF SEVERAL UN RESOLUTIONS. PUT ANOTHER WAY, IF, E.G., THE UN SAYS "THE XYZ PEOPLE OF COUNTRY ABC SHOULD BE PROTECTED", THE FACT THE RESOLUTION DOESNT SPECIFICALLY SAY "BY AIR, LAND, AND SEA FORCES" DOES NOT PRECLUDE USING THOSE MEANS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION UNTIL/UNLESS THE UN SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITS IT.

A COMPLICATING ISSUE IN ANSWERING YOUR QUESTION: WHILE ONW IS NOT PART OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME AGAINST IRAQ IT HAS BECOME INTRINSICALLY LINKED WITH IT AS AN EXPRESSION OF CONTINUED PRESSURE ON IRAQ BY SOME OF THE SAME NATIONS INVOLVED IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM AND THE SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES. AS A RESULT, IT IS RARE TO SEE A SANCTIONS STORY THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE MENTION OF ONW/OSW. TO THAT EXTENT, THERE IS CRITICAL COVERAGE, BUT, WITH REGARD TO ONW, NOT IN ANY DEPTH. OTHER THAN THAT, THERE HAVE BEEN VERY FEW SIGNIFICANT COLLATERAL DAMAGE EVENTS IN ONW, NO ONW LOSSES, AND THE AREA

OF IRAQ MOST OF THE BOMBS FALL ON IS ISOLATED FROM ALMOST ALL DIRECT WESTERN MEDIA COVERAGE.

TOO, I BELIEVE OUR COMMITMENT TO "GOING UGLY EARLY", COMBINED WITH OBVIOUS INSTANCES OF IRAQI LIES ABOUT ALLEGED INCIDENTS, HAS BOUGHT US SOME CREDIBILITY, I.E., SINCE WE HAVE ALWAYS ADMITTED TO OUR COLLATERAL DAMAGE MISTAKES IN THE PAST, WHEN WE SAY WE DIDN'T DO WHAT THE IRAQI'S ALLEGE, THE MEDIA APPEARS TO BELIEVE US. MOST OF THE CRITICISM OF NOW HAS REVOLVED AROUND THE ISSUE OF "WHY ARE WE STILL DOING IT? HOW MUCH LONGER? WHEN DO WE STOP?" THESE ARE DOD/NCA-LEVEL [Department of Defense/National Command Authority] QUESTIONS TO ANSWER.

Question #3: The current study found that all releases available on the U.S. European Command Web site regarding Operation Northern were hard news. Why were there no "feature" news releases?

Answer #3: A COUPLE THOUGHTS: WHAT REALLY CONSTITUTES "FEATURE" COVERAGE OF WHAT IS, AFTER ALL, THE LONGEST CONTINUOUS COMBAT ACTION SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR? SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS PUT A BOUNTY ON AIRCREWS, WHY WOULD WE WANT TO GIVE HIM NAMES AND FACES TO FOCUS ON? EVEN FOR NON-AIRCREW, WHY TEMPT FATE BY GIVING THE "THREAT" A TARGET? ALSO, TURKEY DOESN'T HATE IRAQ SO THERE IS SOME DISCOMFORT WITH CONDUCTING WHAT, FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, IS A WAR AGAINST IRAQ FROM TURKISH SOIL...WE TRY TO BE SENSITIVE TO HOST-NATION CONCERNs.

Question #4: Is there internal monitoring of news release usage? If so, how is it done?

Answer #4: CLEARLY THERE IS ALWAYS A PRE-RELEASE PROCESS, GENERALLY DRIVEN BY OUR APPROVED PAG AND/OR THEMES AND MESSAGES.

WE SPIN THROUGH SEVERAL DOZEN NEWS WEB SITES ON A DAILY BASIS. WE INCLUDE A MIX OF ARAB, U.S., EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL SOURCES. THAT SAID, I DON'T WANT TO OVERSELL THAT, I.E., WE LOOK FOR TRENDS AND INDICATORS OF EMERGING IRAQI IO. THERE IS ALSO, AS I'M SURE DOESN'T SURPRISE YOU, A LOT OF CLASSIFIED INTELL INPUT/ANALYSIS. QUITE HONESTLY, OUR UNCLASSIFIED SOURCE MONITORING/ANALYSIS OFTEN PICKS UP ON ISSUES/INCIDENTS BEFORE THE INTELL SIDE, BUT WE ARE COMING AT IT FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE. THIS IS A LARGELY UNDER-ANALYZED PARADIGM.

FRANKLY, MY INTERNAL JURY IS STILL OUT ON THE UTILITY OF(OR EVEN THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM)MONITORING RELEASES FOR SUCCESS. PUT ANOTHER WAY, WHAT CONSTITUTES A "SUCCESSFUL" RELEASE ABOUT A TRUELY UGLY EVENT (E.G., THE ALLEGED RAPE/MURDER OF 12-YEAR-OLD KOSOVAR GIRL BY A U.S. SOLDIER) THAT WILL NEVER BE ANYTHING LESS THAN UGLY? BALANCE AND FAIRNESS IS PROBABLY THE MEASURE, BUT WHAT ABOUT LESS BLACK AND WHITE EVENTS, OR EVEN GOOD NEWS RELEASES...

HOW "GOOD" DOES THE RESULTING COVERAGE HAVE TO BE TO BE CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL? AND IF THE COVERAGE ISN'T "SUCCESSFUL", THEN WHAT? THROW MORE TRUTH AT THEM? CALL THEIR EDITORS? BLACKLIST THE REPORTER?

YOU'VE ACTUALLY HIT ON THE BIGGEST PROBLEM/CHALLENGE WE FACE IN THE PAO AND IO BUSINESSES...MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE). WHAT IS MOE FOR A GIVEN EVENT/ACTIVITY? WHAT RESOURCES DO WE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MOE? DO THEY CURRENTLY EXIST OR DO WE NEED TO INVENT THEM? WHAT DOES MOE COST? HOW DO WE FACTOR IN CULTURAL DIFFERENCES?

Question #5: How does the ONW public affairs office receive the information included in news releases about Operation Northern Watch?

Answer #5: TO BEGIN, THE ONW RELEASES ARE ACTUALLY WRITTEN AND RELEASED BY EUCOM PAO. WE GET THE RAW DATA FROM ONW PAO, PUT IT INTO, ESSENTIALLY A FORMULAIC INITIAL RELEASE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GET OUT AN INITIAL RELEASE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO ATTEMPT TO PRECLUDE IRAQ'S TAKING CHARGE OF THE AGENDA, E.G., IF IRAQ PUTS OUT THE FIRST RELEASE AND ALLEGES WE KILLED CIVILIANS, THE QUESTIONS TEND TO BE "WHY DID YOU ..." RATHER THAN "DID YOU...".

IN POINT OF FACT, IRAQ ROUTINELY LIES, E.G., THEY HAVE ALLEGED COLLATERAL DAMAGE ON DAYS WE DIDN'T EVEN FLY! IF THERE WAS COLLATERAL DAMAGE (OR A SUSPICION THERE WAS), WE SHOOT FOR AN INITIAL RELEASE, FOLLOWED BY AT LEAST ONE SUBSEQUENT RELEASE ONCE WE GET SOME CONFIRMED DATA. SPECIAL CASES ARE HARM SHOTs, GBUs THAT LOSE LASER-LOCK, OR WHEN WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS OF REAL COLLATERAL DAMAGE. IF ONW DISAGREES WITH US ABOUT A RELEASE, WE'LL LISTEN, BUT ULTIMATELY WE DO WHAT WE THINK MAKES SENSE.

[The information is] USUALLY PASSED TO THE ONW PAO BY AN OPS/INTELL BRIEF AND THEN SENT TO US EITHER SECURE VOICE OR SECURE E-MAIL. AS A "KNOWN" EVENT, I.E., THE IRAQIS KNOW IF WE BOMBED, WE DISCUSS MANY THINGS VIA UNSECURE MEANS, BUT

*Interview with Captain Mike Blass, U.S. Air Force, U.S. European Command Public Affairs,
Stuttgart, Germany*

Question #1. How does Air Force public affairs handle media relations during an on-going situation such as Operation Northern Watch?

Answer #1. MEDIA OPS IN ONW ARE A LITTLE DIFFERENT BECAUSE FOR ONE, WE DON'T OWN THE BASE...IT IS A TURKISH BASE AND WE ARE GUESTS THERE. THIS MEANS THAT ANY TIME WE WANT TO BRING MEDIA ON THE BASE, WE MUST GET TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS) APPROVAL. ONCE WE GET TGS APPROVAL, WE MUST GET THE TURKISH INTELLIGENCE STAFF TO GIVE US BASE ENTRY BADGES. THIS CAN BE A TIMELY PROCESS AND TAKES A LOT OF PLANNING. IN ADDITION, THE WHOLE ONW SITUATION IS SOMETHING THAT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO THE TGS AND WE (THE U.S.) ARE NOT LOOKING FOR A LOT OF HEADLINE PUBLICITY OF OUR OPERATIONS THERE.

THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM SOMETHING LIKE A PLANE CRASH OR A COUTRS MARTIAL BECAUSE ONW (INCLUDING THE FORMER OPERATION KNOWN AS OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT) HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS, BUT IT WASN'T UNTIL DESERT FOX THAT IT REALLY STARTED TO BE NOTICED BY THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS. THE MAIN GOAL OF PA IN ONW IS NOT TO PROMOTE IT, BUT TO ENSURE WE HAVE ACCURATE INFORMATION OUT FIRST, SO THAT ANY INNACURATE INFORMATION OR LIES THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS PUTTING OUT HAS NO CREDIBILITY. WE DO HAVE SOME HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE STUFF THAT WE DO FOR ONW, BUT THE WHOLE THING WITH ONW IS TO KEEP IT RELATIVELY LOW KEY. WE DON'T MIND THE PUBLIC KNOWING ABOUT IT, BUT WE DON'T WANT IT ON THE FRONT PAGE OF EVERY PAPER EVERY DAY.

WE HAVE TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES AND TO THE SECURITY OF OUR TROOPS OVER THERE. WE DO PROVIDE INFO ON OUR WEB PAGE ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE OPERATION, BUT WE DON'T GET INTO DETAIL ABOUT WHAT EXACTLY WE DO. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT WE ARE THERE TO ENFORCE THE NORTHERN NO-FLY ZONE AND IF CHALLENGED BY AAA, RADAR, OR SAMS, WE WILL RESPOND IN SELF DEFENSE. WE DO PROVIDE PEOPLE FOR INTERVIEWS AND WE HAVE INTERVIEWED PILOTS AS WELL AS SUPPORT PERSONNEL.

WE ARE NOT TRYING TO HIDE WHAT WE ARE DOING...WE ARE DOING GOOD THINGS AND WE ARE DOING WHAT WE WERE MANDATED TO DO, HOWEVER, THERE ARE THE HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES THAT WE MUST BE AWARE OF.

FRANKLY, MY INTERNAL JURY IS STILL OUT ON THE UTILITY OF(OR EVEN THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM)MONITORING RELEASES FOR SUCCESS. PUT ANOTHER WAY, WHAT CONSTITUTES A "SUCCESSFUL" RELEASE ABOUT A TRUELY UGLY EVENT (E.G., THE ALLEGED RAPE/MURDER OF 12-YEAR-OLD KOSOVAR GIRL BY A U.S. SOLDIER) THAT WILL NEVER BE ANYTHING LESS THAN UGLY? BALANCE AND FAIRNESS IS PROBABLY THE MEASURE, BUT WHAT ABOUT LESS BLACK AND WHITE EVENTS, OR EVEN GOOD NEWS RELEASES...

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IN POINT OF FACT, IRAQ ROUTINELY LIES, E.G., THEY HAVE ALLEGED COLLATERAL DAMAGE ON DAYS WE DIDN'T EVEN FLY! IF THERE WAS COLLATERAL DAMAGE (OR A SUSPICION THERE WAS), WE SHOOT FOR AN INITIAL RELEASE, FOLLOWED BY AT LEAST ONE SUBSEQUENT RELEASE ONCE WE GET SOME CONFIRMED DATA. SPECIAL CASES ARE HARM SHOTs, GBUs THAT LOSE LASER-LOCK, OR WHEN WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS OF REAL COLLATERAL DAMAGE. IF ONW DISAGREES WITH US ABOUT A RELEASE, WE'LL LISTEN, BUT ULTIMATELY WE DO WHAT WE THINK MAKES SENSE.

[The information is] USUALLY PASSED TO THE ONW PAO BY AN OPS/INTELL BRIEF AND THEN SENT TO US EITHER SECURE VOICE OR SECURE E-MAIL. AS A "KNOWN" EVENT, I.E., THE IRAQIS KNOW IF WE BOMBED, WE DISCUSS MANY THINGS VIA UNSECURE MEANS, BUT

EVEN KNOWN EVENTS USUALLY HAVE AN OPSEC ISSUE, E.G., SPECIFIC WEAPON USED. ALSO FREQUENTLY SENT TO US VIA SECURE E-MAIL VIA OTHER CHANNELS.

FRANKLY, IT IS RARE THAT THE PENTAGON IS THE FIRST TO TELL THE WORLD THAT THERE WAS AN OWN COLLATERAL DAMAGE INCIDENT. IN FACT, I'VE BEEN HERE FOR THE ENTIRE POST-DESERT FOX PERIOD, AND THEY HAVE ALWAYS TALKED AFTER OUR RELEASE IS ALREADY ON THE WEB. IT MAY APPEAR THEY ARE ANNOUNCING IT BECAUSE THE PENTAGON PRESS (FORGIVE THE HYPERBOLE) TEND TO BELIEVE ALL THINGS ARE KNOWN FIRST AT THE PENTAGON. THAT'S REALLY NOT FAIR BECAUSE MANY OF THEM SCAN OUR WEB PAGES DAILY (SIDE NOTE, THE EUCOM WEB SITE AVERAGES 30,000 HITS A DAY...THAT IS ADDING ALL THE HITS FOR THE EUCOM PAGES, NOT JUST THE OWN PAGE). AT ITS HEART, IT'S ACTUALLY PRETTY SIMPLE:

--IF, AT THE CONCLUSION OF A MISSION DURING WHICH WE DROPPED/FIRED WEAPONS, IT APPEARS THE ODDS OF A CD INCIDENT ARE NEGLIGIBLE, WE PUT OUT A PRETTY UNAMBIGUOUS RELEASE.

--IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION ARE "HAZY", WE WILL DO AN INITIAL RELEASE THAT IS CONSIDERABLY LESS ABSOLUTE, AND FOLLOW WITH A MORE DETAILED RELEASE AS SOON AS WE ARE FAIRLY SURE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

--IF, AFTER TIME, IT IS STILL NOT DEFINITIVE, BUT LOOKS LIKELY/POSSIBLE, WE GENERALLY WILL SAY THAT IT IS POSSIBLE UNINTENDED DAMAGE/INJURIES MAY HAVE RESULTED WHEN OUR AIRCRAFT WERE FORCED TO RESPOND IN SELF-DEFENSE TO AN IRAQI ATTACK (AAA/SAM) OR THREAT (USUALLY AN AIR DEFENSE RADAR) AND THAT THE RESULTS OF THE INCIDENT ARE STILL BEING ANALYZED.

--AGAIN, ONCE WE KNOW FOR "SURE" (AND WHEN YOU DON'T OWN THE GROUND YOUR WEAPONS HIT, THAT IS ALWAYS SOMEWHAT PROBLEMATIC) WE TELL THE TRUTH...GOOD...BAD...OR UGLY.

A LITTLE MORE EXPLANATION...ONE REASON WHY IT MAY LOOK THIS WAY, IS THAT THE BRIEFINGS ARE OFTEN TELEVISED. ALSO, WITH A 6-7 HOUR TIME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HERE AND D.C., THE FLYING WINDOWS OFTEN DICTATE THAT WE PUT OUT OUR RELEASE WHILE THE U.S. MORNING PAPERS ARE HITTING THE STREET, ERGO, YOU DON'T SEE OUR RELEASE REFLECTED IN YOUR MORNING PAPER, BUT YOU WILL SEE/HEAR IT ON CNN. THIS CREATES THE LARGELY INACCURATE IMPRESSION THAT THE PENTAGON IS BREAKING THE NEWS...WHEN THEY ARE REALLY REPEATING IT.

Question #2. How would you perceive the coverage of Operation Northern Watch stories in the print media?

Answer #2. THE MEDIA TENDS TO BE BALANCED WHEN THEY DO A STORY, AND > MOST SEEM TO NOT TAKE WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN SAYS AS CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, THE REPORTS WITH A DATELINE BAGHDAD ALL TEND TO LEAD WITH HOW WE KILLED SOMEONE WITH OUR ATTACKS AND HOW WE ARE UNJUSTIFIED IN PROTECTING OURSELVES. AGAIN, THE CREDIBILITY OF THESE STORIES IS REALLY LOW. PLUS, WE GET OUR INFO OUT THERE RIGHT AWAY SO THAT LOWERS THERE CREDIBILITY EVEN MORE BECAUSE IT TAKES THEM A WHILE SOMETIMES TO GET THEIR INFO OUT THERE. I WOULD SAY THAT THE MEDIA CONSIDERS ONW ROUTINE AND UNLESS SOMETHING HAPPENS LIKE A PLANE GETTING SHOT DOWN, MEDIA INTEREST WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY LOW.

Question #3. The current study found that all releases available on the U.S. European Command Web site regarding Operation Northern were hard news. Why were there no "feature" news releases?

Answer #3. AS FAR AS THE FEATURES PORTION, WE ARE WORKING A HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE TYPE WEB PAGE FOR THE FOLKS AT ONW. THERE HAVE BEEN STORIES IN THE INCIRLIK PAPER, AS WELL AS THE ONW INSERT THAT IS DONE EACH WEEK. THE STANDING POLICY IS THAT ONLY THE GENERALS MAY NOT TALK TO THE MEDIA WITHOUT EUCOM APPROVAL.

THE PILOTS AND SUPPORT PEOPLE MAY TALK TO THEM IF THEY WANT, AND IT IS THEIR CHOICE TO SANITIZE THEIR UNIFORMS OR HAVE THEIR PICTURE USED. AS FAR AS NOT SEEING ANYTHING ON THE EUCOM WEB SITE...WELL, THAT IS IN THE WORKS AND WE PROBABLY COULD HAVE PUT LINKS FROM OUR PAGE TO THE ONES ON THE USAFE WEB PAGES, BUT HIND-SITE IS 20/20. THE SECURITY THING HAS BEEN AND WILL ALWAYS BE AN ISSUE, BUT FOR A WHILE, ALL USAFE WEB SITES WERE RESTRICTED TO A .MIL ADDRESS SO IT WASN'T A PROBLEM. ONCE THEY OPENED UP THE RESTRICTION, THEN ALL THE INFORMATION BECAME PUBLIC.

THE TURKISH HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES ARE ALSO SOMETHING WE HAVE TO BE AWARE OF. THESE ARE SOMETHING THAT CENTCOM DOESN'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT. YES WE WANT TO RECOGNIZE OUR PEOPLE WHO ARE DOING GOOD STUFF AT ONW, BUT WE ALSO DON'T WANT ONW ON THE FRONT PAGE OF EVERY NEWSPAPER EITHER.

Question #4. Is there internal monitoring of news release usage? If so, how is it done?

Answer #4. THE RELEASE HAS CHANGED A BIT OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, PARTLY DUE TO HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES AND PARTLY DUE TO THE PREFERENCES OF THE BOSSSES IN CHARGE AT THE TIME. THE CURRENT RELEASE WE USE IS WHAT WAS AGREED UPON BY THE PREVIOUS GENERAL, THE TGS, AND THE DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief] AT EUCOM.

FOR ROUTINE RELEASES, ONW GIVES ME THE INFORMATION, AND I POST IT ON THE SITE. IF SOMETHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY HAPPENS AND WE NEED TO MODIFY THE RELEASE, ONW WOULD RUN A PROPOSED RELEASE BY HER BOSS, AND THEN SEND IT TO US FOR REVIEW.

WE DON'T HAVE A PROGRAM SET UP HERE AT EUCOM TO MONITOR THE PROGRAM AT ONW, BUT MAYBE THEY DO. HOWEVER, COMING FROM THE LIFE OF TQM AND METRICS MYSELF, I KNOW THAT THE METRICS TENDED TO BE USED TO PUNISH RATHER THAN AS A TOOL TO EFFECTIVELY EVALUATE AND THEREFORE PEOPLE WOULD PENCIL-WHIP THEIR STATS TO SAY WHATEVER THE GENERAL WANTED TO HEAR THUS MAKING THEM USELESS. I WOULD SAY THAT AS LONG AS MEDIA POSITION STAYS POSITIVE, OR AT LEAST NEUTRAL AND ONW ISN'T ON THE FRONT PAGES EVERY DAY, THEN THEY HAVE DONE THEIR JOB.

Question #5. How does the ONW public affairs office receive the information included in news releases about Operation Northern Watch?

Answer #5. BASICALLY THEY GET THE INFORMATION FROM THEIR OPS FOLKS AND FROM SITREPS. THEY ALSO ATTEND THE OUTBRIEFS. THEY THEN PREPARE A RELEASE AND PASS IT ON TO US WHERE WE POST IT TO OUR WEB PAGE. WE USUALLY DON'T CHANGE WHAT THEY SEND US, BUT THERE MAY BE A REASON WHY WE MIGHT ADD OR DELETE INFORMATION ON OUR RELEASE. NEGATIVE INFORMATION IS RELEASED THE SAME WAY AS THE OTHER INFORMATION...WE MERELY ADD A LINE THAT STATES THE SITUATION.

IF WE THINK THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CASUALTIES, BUT ARE UNSURE, WE WILL USUALLY SEND OUT A SECOND RELEASE AFTER WE GET MORE INFO FROM THE INTEL FOLKS. IF WE KNOW A BOMB WENT OFF TARGET, WE WILL SAY THAT IN THE INITIAL RELEASE. THE KEY IS THAT WE WANT TO BE PROACTIVE, RATHER THAN REACTIVE TO SUDDAM HUSSEIN'S CLAIMS. WE THEN PASS THAT INFO ON TO OSD PA WHERE THEY MAY OR MAY NOT BRIEF IT AT THE PRESS BRIEFING. SO TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, THEY DO GET ANSWERED AT EUCOM LEVEL, BUT SOMETIMES THEY ALSO GET ELEVATED SIMPLY DUE TO A REPORTER ASKING THE QUESTION IN ONE OF THE BRIEFS.

SOMETIMES IT APPEARS THINGS GET ELEVATED TO DOD WHEN IN REALITY IT REALLY STARTED THERE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SOMEONE CONTACTS DOD EVEN BEFORE WE FIND OUT ABOUT SOMETHING. BUT WHEN IT COMES TO NEGATIVE INFORMATION, WE TRY TO RELEASE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE HERE AT EUCOM AND THEN WE SEND IT UP TO DOD FOR RELEASE UP THERE AS WELL. IT MAY APPEAR THAT IT IS ALWAYS DOD RELEASING IT SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE VISIBLE THAN WE ARE, BUT THAT SIMPLY ISN'T THE CASE.

Appendix K

Headlines of news releases

U.S. European Command News Releases

(* - indicates releases used by articles examined)

December 1999

Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(30 Dec)
Iraqis fire AAA at ONW aircraft	(12 Dec)*
Iraqis fire AAA at ONW aircraft	(4 Dec)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(2 Dec)

November 1999

Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(28 Nov)*
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(27 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(25 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(22 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(14 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(9 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(8 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(3 Nov)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft again	(1 Nov)

October 1999

Iraqis fire once again at ONW aircraft	(28 Oct)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft again	(27 Oct)
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(25 Oct)*
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(17 Oct)
Iraqis launch against ONW aircraft	(14 Oct)*
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft again	(6 Oct)
Iraq fires anti-aircraft artillery at ONW patrol, ONW responds	(3 Oct)

September 1999

ONW aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire	(27 Sep)
Iraqis again attack ONW aircraft	(13 Sep)*
Iraqis attack ONW aircraft again	(10 Sep)*
Iraqis resume attacks on ONW aircraft	(9 Sep)
Iraqis continue to fire at ONW aircraft	(3 Sep)*
Iraqis target ONW aircraft	(2 Sep)
Iraqis continue to fire at ONW aircraft	(1 Sep)

August 1999

Iraqis continue to fire at ONW aircraft	(28 Aug)*
Iraqis fire at ONW aircraft	(25 Aug)

Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(23 Aug)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire and targeting radar	(17 Aug)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(16 Aug) *
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(15 Aug)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi SAM launch	(13 Aug) *
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(10 Aug)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(9 Aug)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(4 Aug)*

July 1999

Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(30 July)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(29 July)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(28 July)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(27 July)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(26 July)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(18 July)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(16 July)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(14 July)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(13 July) *
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(8 July) *
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(2 July)*

June 1999

Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar, AAA fire	(28 June)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar, AAA fire	(22 June)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar, AAA fire	(21 June)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar and AAA fire	(18 June)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(15 June)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(9 June)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar, AAA fire	(8 June)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar, AAA fire	(3 June)
Coalition aircraft targeted by Iraqi radar	(2 June)*

May 1999

Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar and AAA fire	(31 May)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire	(25 May)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi ground fire	(23 May)
Coalition aircraft targeted by Iraqi radar	(15 May)*
Coalition aircraft targeted and fired upon at ONW	(12 May)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar threats	(11 May)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi threats	(10 May)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar threats	(8 May)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi missiles	(3 May)

Coalition aircraft targeted and fired upon (2 May)*

April 1999

Coalition aircraft fired upon by Iraqi AAA	(30 Apr)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi fire	(29 Apr)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi threats	(27 Apr)*
Iraqi radar targets coalition forces	(25 Apr)
ONW coalition forces respond to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire	(22 Apr)*
ONW coalition forces respond to Iraqi AAA and radar threats	(21 Apr)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar	(19 Apr)*
Iraqis threaten coalition aircraft	(17 Apr)*

March 1999

Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar	(16 Mar)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi threats	(15 Mar)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi threats	(14 Mar)*
Coalition aircraft respond in self-defense	(12 Mar)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi threat	(9 Mar)*
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi threat	(8 Mar)*
ONW coalition forces respond to Iraqi AAA and radar threats	(6 Mar)*
Coalition forces respond to Iraqi radar threat	(1 Mar)*

February 1999

Anti-aircraft artillery fired at coalition aircraft	(28 Feb)*
Anti-aircraft artillery fired at coalition aircraft	(23 Feb)*
Coalition aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar	(22 Feb)
Coalition aircraft illuminated	(19 Feb)
More coalition aircraft targeted	(15 Feb)
Coalition aircraft fired upon	(12 Feb)
Coalition aircraft targeted	(11 Feb)*
Iraq pulls back air defenses	(4 Feb)*
Coalition aircraft targeted over northern Iraq	(2 Feb)*

January 1999

Coalition aircraft targeted by Iraq	(31 Jan)
More coalition aircraft targeted	(30 Jan)*
U.S. aircraft attack Iraqi air defense sites	(30 Jan)*
Events at Operation Northern Watch	(28 Jan)
U.S. aircraft attack Iraqi air defense sites	(26 Jan)
Coalition aircraft targeted	(25 Jan)*
Patriots to deploy to Turkey	(16 Jan)
Coalition aircraft attack Iraqi SAM Sites	(14 Jan)*

Coalition aircraft illuminated and respond	(13 Jan)
ONW aircraft fires on Iraqi radar site	(12 Jan)*
ONW aircraft again respond to Iraqi threats	(11 Jan)*
ONW aircraft respond against Iraqi missile site	(7 Jan)

December 1998

ONW aircraft attacked by Iraqi SAMs	(28 Dec)*
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Air Force/Department of Defense News Releases

Air Force News Service

EF-111s taking final flight soon	(19 Jun 97)
Misawa troops support SW Asia mission	(23 Jun 97)
Allies strike Iraqi missile site	(28 Dec 98)*
Reserve KC-135s support no-fly zone over Iraq	(26 Jan 99)
Iraq targets coalition aircraft	(11 Feb 99)*
Ryan praises forces at Incirlik	(2 Mar 99)
Coalition forces strike with greater flexibility	(2 Mar 99)
British Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre vital to ONW	(21 Apr 99)
Army patriot battery "always prepared" at ONW	(3 May 99)
Gamblers jump into action at ONW	(4 May 99)
When coalition aircraft need a boost, KC-135 ANG unit delivers	(10 May 99)
ONW soldiers rescue Turkish boy	(12 May 99)
Northern Watch mission remains important to stability	(20 May 99)
Fuels troops deliver at ONW	(21 May 99)
Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi radar and ground fire	(2 Jun 99)
77 th FS Gamblers successful at ONW	(7 Jun 99)
Shelton visits ONW	(20 Aug 99)
ONW brings friends together	(20 Aug 99)

Defenselink

Iraq crisis easing, not over	(17 Jun 98)
Cohen talks Kosovo, Iraq with European allies	(9 Feb 99)
Pentagon responds to Iraqi threats against Allied hosts	(17 Feb 99)
Cohen says U.S. will contain Iraq	(5 Mar 99)
Cohen declares no-fly zone "successful"	(10 Mar 99)
When diplomacy fails, it's time for action, Cohen says	(11 Mar 99)
Vigilant pilots face Iraqi threats	(15 Mar 99)

U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)

F-15E WSOs guide technology to target	(15 Apr 99)
Incirlik firefighters trained, ready for call	(4 May 99)
More troops to arrive at Incirlik	(9 Jun 99)
Defense Secretary visits Incirlik, ONW troops	(16 Jul 99)
Shelton amazed at Saddam's actions	(27 Aug 99)
Northern Watch unit aids in medical evacuation	(27 Aug 99)

* -- indicates releases used by articles examined

Air Combat Command (ACC)

Shaw unit supports ONW	(16 Jan 98)
Most deployment locations now have website addresses	(13 Feb 98)
Eglin wing deploys to Turkey	(30 Jul 98)
Rockets return from ONW	(14 Oct 99)

Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)

Reservists support Persian Gulf buildup, other missions	(20 Feb 98)
Reserve support of Persian Gulf buildup slows	(13 Mar 98)
Reserve KC-135s support no-fly zone over Iraq	(25 Jan 99)
Reserve F-16s deploy with laser bombs to Northern Watch	(8 Apr 99)
Air Force reservists continue support of AEFs	(15 Dec 99)